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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This analysis addresses the implications of varying product lia-
bility rules for observed consumer related accidents. There are three 
parts to this paper. The first, chapter three, consists of a modifi-
cation of the prior theoretical approach that allows for an analysis 
of the provision of care by consumers. The probability of being in-
volved in a product related accident is assumed to be dependant on the 
amount of time spent being careful, while the severity of the accident 
is fixed. The model is simplified by analyzing the situation in which 
there is one good, consumption, which is combined with leisure time to 
produce utility. Expected utility theory is then used to develop a 
simple comparative static analysis of the consumer's response in his 
provision of care with a change in the consumer's burden of liability. 
Ceteris paribus, a reasonably strong conclusion is that care will fall 
as the burden of liability falls. This is an intuitively satisfying 
result. Intuition dictates that a fall in the benefits which results 
from the provision of an activity should reduce the incentive to pro-
vide the activity. Thus, as the benefits fall for the consumer's pro-
vision of care, the consumer will provide less care. Previous analy-
sis by Spence [1973] indicate that the producer's care will rise as 
they try to escape the costs of liability. These results combine to 
yield an ambiguous result with respect to overall observed consumer 
1 
related accidents. This ambiguity is enhanced when informational and 
ability constraints are considered. This implies that the impact of 
changes in liability should vary with respect to significance across 
products when used as an explanatory variable of observed product re-
lated accidents. This implication is consistent with the regression 
results in chapter five. 
Chapter four provides a discussion of the legal history of pro-
duct liability and certain issues involved in the evolution of product 
liability tort. Chapter five contains the empirical results. The re-
sults are mixed for all coefficients except the measure of the rule of 
liability. The liability rule has significance for ladders, power 
saws, stairs and steps, televisions, bunkbeds, and lawn mowers at 
levels of confidence of ninety five percent or greater. The final 
chapter contains conclusions and discussion. 
2 
CHAPTER II 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are two systems in the United States which address 
perceived problems with respect to product failures and the resultant 
losses. The first of these is a system of regulatory agencies 
(C.P.S.C., F.D.A., O.S.H.A. and others) which are responsible for 
meeting social objectives with respect to this perceived problem and 
usually thought of as increasing "safety." The second is a legal sys-
tem which has evolved rules for specifying those parties which absorb 
losses when an accident occurs. Each system attempts to address the 
problem of losses which result from the use of products. In this 
chapter the literature addressing each system will be briefly 
reviewed, emphasizing recent estimates of the impact of safety regula-
tions and the basic theoretical analysis of products liability. 
Section 1: The Regulation of Product Safety 
The focus in this section is on the regulatory environment and 
the implications of attempting to regulate the risk involved in using 
a product. Regulatory agencies have three available methods to reduce 
the risk of consumption: (1) directly regulating the characteristics 
of a product, (2) banning a product, and (3) disseminating information 
about this risk in an effort to alter consumer behavior. Of these 
methods, direct regulation and product bans are the most commonly 
3 
used. This is, perhaps, unfortunate, (from an economist's perspec-
tive) because with perfect information and well operating markets, the 
efficient solution will result without external intervention. Inform-
ation dissemination may well be the most effective method of achieving 
the efficient level of risk. 
Regulatory agencies are influenced either directly (as with the 
E.P.A.) or indirectly (as with the C.P.S.C.) by the political office 
holder of the day. The officials at the E.P.A. serve at the pleasure 
of the President and at the independent agencies the commissioners are 
appointed for fixed terms. While it would be overstating the situa-
tion to say that the system is rife with political cronyism, there is 
little doubt that political influences exist. 
Grabowski and Vernon [1978] noted the following general charac-
teris.tics of the direct regulation of products. 
(1) 11 ••• Congress has strongly favored direct regulatory con-
1 Ill tro ... 
(2) " ... the decision making process at the various agencies tends to 
embody a strong "safety imperative." 2 
(3) "There currently exists little effort to design regulatory 
policies so as to complement existing market and legal incentives 
3 
regarding product safety." 
(4) "Product safety standards and regulations can result in signifi-
cant unintended side effects on the long-term competitive struc-
ture of an industry." 4 
Grabowski and Vernon go on to point out two problems with attempts 
4 
at risk regulation. The first is that the regulators of products tend 
not to use cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to implement a 
5 
product related regulation. 5 The second problem is the failure to use 
the dissemination of information in the effort to reduce accidents. 
As previously noted, if the problem is informational then the most 
effective way to resolve this problem may be to provide information. 
If markets are well functioning and there are no problems with 
information, then the consumer will purchase and use a product so that 
he has the largest expected utility. If a regulation is placed on a 
product which makes it safer to use, consumers will revalue their pro-
vision of care (since the marginal conditions are changed) and reduce 
its level. As products become safer consumers become more careless. 
Peltzman [1975], Crandall and Graham [1984] and Viscusi [1984, 1985] 
have provided evidence that the imposition of safety regulations on 
products has not provided any meaningful reduction in the rate of 
accidents. The analysis of seat belts indicated that people responded 
to a safer situation by being less careful with no apparent total ef-
6 feet. Viscusi [1984, 1985] analyzed the impact of requiring safety 
lids on nonprescription drugs. There was no apparent shift in poison-
ing rates and an apparent "lulling" effect for products not protected 
with higher observed rates of poisoning. 
There are also potential anticompetitive impacts from safety reg-
ulation. By requiring a safety feature or detailed safety specifica-
tion the small producer may be placed at a substantial disadvantage. 
If standards require substantial premarket testing of a product there 
could also be a disadvantage. Viscusi [1984] noted the use of bicycle 
regulations by the domestic bicycle industry to exclude foreign com-
petitors. Grabowski, Vernon and Thomas [1978] indicated that the 
stringent controls placed on pharmaceutical firms with regard to pre-
market testing may well have increased research and development costs 
resulting in a substantially more concentrated market than would 
otherwise be the case. 
From a neoclassical economic perspective there is no need for 
intervention into a market when all parties are informed accurately 
d f 11 d k . . 7 an u y an mar ets are compet~t~ve. Yet, there has evolved a dual 
system to address the perceived problems of accidents involving pro-
ducts: the regulatory system as previously discussed and the products 
liability system. The remainder of this analysis will focus on the 
nature and impact of the system of products liability. 
Section 2: Analyses of McKean [1968, 1973], Buchanan [1968] and 
Calabresi and Bass [1968] 
In 1968, several economists and lawyers participated in a sympo-
sium on products liability at the Hoover Institute. 8 The format con-
sisted of an extensive discussion of products liability by Professor 
6 
Roland McKean [1970] and comments by several individuals, most notably 
Professor James Buchanan [1970] and Professor Guido Calabresi and 
Kenneth Bass [1970]. These participants sketched the situation with 
respect to products liability and brought forth, early on, the issues 
involved. 
McKean noted that through the 1960s the trend had been for a 
larger share of losses involved in product failures to be placed on 
producers. McKean attributed this shift to greater producer liability 
to an expanding definition of a product, easing of the burdens of 
proof and a rise in the level of punitive damages. It was also noted 
that while the burden increased, the impact was offset by rising 
levels of liability insurance. with all factors considered, McKean 
concluded that the rise in producer liability during the 1960s was 
small and consisted of a slightly larger chance of the producer being 
forced to compensate the injured party. 
7 
McKean also emphasized the importance of transactions costs, 
noting (within a Coasian framework) that in the absence of transac-
tions costs, the liability assignment will not affect the provision of 
care by either party. The usual analysis was applied with negotiation 
and compensation occurring in order to ensure the efficient production 
and provision of care. This analysis was extended to the situation in 
which there are transaction and information costs with the conclusion 
that several systems of liability could be defended. McKean (1970] 
restates in a later summarization that with positive transactions 
costs different liability assignments can result in "significant" dif-
ferences in resource use. 
Buchanan [1970 p. 72] argued that "cavaet emptor encourages the 
maximum range of products geared to meet all variations in demand." 
When restraints are placed on quality there is a reduction in low 
quality goods provided with an adverse impact on the poor. His de-
fense of "cavaet emptor" thus implies a gain with respect to both 
equity and efficiency. Buchanan also noted that deviation from no 
liability may be advisable on a selective basis, such as with third 
party losses, but that "some prejudice" towards no liability should be 
evidenced initially and departed from reluctantly. Calabresi and Bass 
[1968] emphasized that an ad hoc approach to matching liability rules 
to products is needed due to differences in the nature of risks in-
volved and the amount of information available. 
Section 3: The Analyses of Spence (1977] and Oi [1973] 
Oi [1973] made two assumptions, which focused attention on a 
limiting case. 9 These were that the product was inherently dangerous 
and that all parties were fully informed. The assumption of an inher-
ently dangerous product focused the analysis on those situations in 
which the only way for product safety to rise was for the producer to 
provide a safer product. The second assumption was criticized by 
Green [1974] and later relaxed by Spence [1977]. 
8 
Oi started his analysis by developing a theory of demand for a 
risky product. The consumer was a utility maximizer who received 
utility from the good units of the risky good (the Z good units of the 
X purchased) and some other nonrisky good (Y). By allowing the non-
risky good to be stated as a residual, utility was stated as a func-
tion only of the risky good. It was noted that when the consumer re-
gularly purchased a good, they would eventually learn that, from X 
units purchased, Z would, on average, be good. IT was the proportion 
of good units. The consumer's total cost of the procurement of Z 
units was the sum of their outlays plus the expected damage costs. 
The consumer's total cost divided by the number of units yielded the 
expected full price, P*. Oi then demonstrated that under the condi-
tions specified a "basis" for the emergence of an insurance industry 
existed, and in the absence of an insurance market the consumer could 
self-insure by borrowing and saving over time. It was shown that a 
rise in the proportion of good units IT, holding the market price, P, 
constant would lead to a fall in P~'<- and thus a rise in the demand for 
good units Z. The demand for the parent good, X, was shown to rise 
only if the elasticity of demand for the parent unit with respect to 
the market price satisfies the following condition: 10 
1 
- 11p > --w 
1 + -p 
where ?7p is the market price elasticity of demand, P is the market 
price and W is the net damage costs. 
Oi's analysis continued with an exposition on the situation in 
which there were two products with different rates of failure. In 
deciding between the two goods, the consumer compared the full prices 
of the two goods and chose that which offered the lower full price. 
This result also allowed the calculation of a critical level of damage 
h . h 11 w 1.c was 
" " 
where 
which are the warranty prices, and 
and 
9 
1 - II 2 
which were the actuarially fair insurance premiums for the goods. 
Consumers separated into two groups, one with damages larger than the 
critical level who purchase the less risky good and the other with 
damages less than the critical level who purchase the more risky 
10 
good. It was shown that the government could place a tax on the more 
risky good which would raise the full price of the good, thus reducing 
the losses from the consumption of the risky good. If this tax were 
large enough, consumption of the risky good would cease and accident 
costs would fall. Oi emphasized that this does not mean welfare in-
creased. Those consumers who would have been willing to purchase the 
more risky product were clearly on a lower indifference curve. 
An analysis of behavior under conditions of producer liability was 
also conducted. The producer was forced into a tie-in sale where a 
full-coverage insurance policy was offered with each unit of the risky 
good. Under these circumstances the consumer would disregard the po-
tential losses and consume the good with the lowest price. Since mar-
kets were competitive, equilibrium "full supply" prices were the 
same. As long as producers were unable to discriminate, income was 
redistributed from low-loss consumers to high-loss consumers because 
the low-loss consumers were forced to subsidize part of the high-loss 
consumers' insurance costs. 
Oi further demonstrated that the shift from consumer liability to 
producer liability could increase the demand for the risky product and 
result in an increase in product failure-related losses. Whether the 
11 
use of the more risky product rises or falls was shown to be dependent 
on the relationship of the net damage costs ·across all consumers, W, 
to the critical net damage costs, w~~. If W > w~~ then the producers of 
the less risky product would gain the advantage with a lower full-sup-
ply price. The more risky product disappeared. If W < W* then the 
producer of the more risky product would gain the advantage with the 
resultant disappearance of the less risky product. The high-loss con-
sumers purchase the high-risk product because their losses were fully 
compensated by the producer. When the analysis was extended to a 
multiproduct market (more than two qualities being available, the 
range of product safety would tend to be narrower. 
Oi's analysis was criticized by Goldberg [1974) primarily on the 
basis of Oi's assumption of full information. Goldberg pointed out 
that Oi's conclusions were critically dependent on the assumption of 
full information. Spence's [1977] analysis acted to remedy this 
shortcoming. Spence's assumptions were similar to those of Oi with 
the exception of full information. Spence extended the analysis to 
allow for imperfect information and damages which affect the 
consumer's valuation of income. The consumer maximized expected util-
ity and, with perfectly competitive markets, a zero expected profit 
was assumed. 
Spence started with the case of the risk-neutral consumer in which 
the value of income was not changed by the accident. His results 
indicated that, in the case of risk-neutral consumers who underesti-
mated the probability of product failure, there will be no voluntary 
producer liability, and, if the perceptions of product failure are im-
perfectly responsive to changes in the actual rates of failure, safety 
12 
will be under supplied. 12 Spence further indicated that in the above 
situation, the first best outcome is attainable under producer liabil-
13 ity, with this liability equal to the normal loss to the consumer. 
Spence's analysis then turned to the risk-averse consumer. His 
analysis indicated that when consumers underestimated the probability 
of failure for any given perceived probability of failure, insurance 
will be under supplied. The analysis further indicated that for any 
fixed level of insurance, perceived failures are optimally set only if 
the perception of failure is perfectly responsive to changes in the 
actual failure. 14 
With the inability to achieve the optimum when consumers are risk 
averse and the information is imperfect, Spence introduced a second 
liability of the producer. This is the producer's liability to the 
state. Spence demonstrated that, under the assumptions of his analy-
sis, that two-stage liability of the producer (to consumer and to 
state) will allow the attainment of the global optimum. Spence has 
also pointed out that, as far as policy options are concerned, the in-
formation requirements are much larger in the direct regulation of 
safety and liability with a risk-averse consumer liability with a 
riskneutral consumer and informing-the-consumer options. It was noted 
that with variegated consumer preferences that producers tend to pro-
duce the wrong range of products and, for any given range of products, 
consumers tend to purchase the wrong quality of product. 
The analyses of Spence [1977] and Oi [1973] provided a useful 
start to a quantitative analysis of products liability. Oi [1973] 
demonstrated that (l) the market will achieve the optimum level of 
15 
safety as long as information is perfect and (2) with perfect in-
16 formation and producer liability "safety" could rise or fall. 
Spence [1977] showed that (1) if information is imperfect, producer 
13 
liability to the consumer must be supplemented in order to attain the 
"global optimum" 17 and (2) that the information requirements are much 
more severe when liability with risk-averse consumers or direct regu-
lation is used than when liability with risk-neutral consumers or in-
f 0 • d 18 ormlng consumers lS use . 
Section 4: Extensions 
The simple analyses developed by Oi and Spence have been extended 
to consider the importance of monopoly power (Hamada [1976], Mantell 
[1984], Epple and Raviv [1978], Polinsky and Rogerson [1984]), insur-
ance (Epple and Ravis [1978]) and noncompensable damages (Grahm and 
Pierce [1985]). 
Hamada [1976] was the first to relax the assumption of a perfectly 
competitive market setting. His initial analysis retained the assump-
tions that damages are exclusively under the control of the producer, 
and that consumers are risk neutral. Figure's 1 and 2 are reproduc-
tions of Hamada's figures one and two. 19 Hamada's initial methodology 
was to compare total surplus (consumers plus producers) under condi-
tions of full and no liability when the producer can provide the least 
cost accident avoidance. DD* is the consumer's cost of avoidance and 
ss~~ iS the prOdUcer IS COSt Of avoidance. \Vhen there iS n0 risk in the 
consumption of this good, total surplus will be triangle DPS with a 
market price of P' . \Vhen there is a risk to consumption let DD">'< be 
the cost of the accident to the consumer. If the consumer must bear 
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the losses, the demand curve will shift to D~~D~~, with equilibrium at 
point Q1 and a market price of Q', and total surplus of D~~Q1 S. 
16 
If the producers cost of avoidance is ss~'<" (here less than DD~~), 
then the largest total surplus occurred when the producer provided the 
care. Hamada demonstrated that this result was achieved regardless of 
the rule of liability. His conclusion was that neither income dis-
tribution nor resource allocation was affected by the rule of liabil-
ity as long as there was full consumer information and as long as the 
victims were the purchasers of the product. 20 Similar results were 
obtained in the situation where a monopolistic seller existed; this is 
illustrated in Figure 2. Marginal revenue shifts down by the amount 
of the loss, from MR to MR~~. While the total surplus remains less 
than its maximum level due to the existence of a monopoly, the distri-
bution of the surplus remains unaffected by the rule of liability. 
Hamada then generalized the model to allow for the provision of 
care by consumers and variable consumption of the good. Hamada's re-
sults indicated that under perfect competition the rules for minimiz-
ing unit social cost also maximized total social surplus and that the 
level of production and the distribution of surplus is unaffected by 
the rule of liability. 21 Hamada emphasizes that this conclusion is 
predicated on informed and rational consumers, and if this condition 
does not exist then the validity of the use of the market to provide 
care must come into question. Despite his reservations, the analysis 
of Hamada tends to reinforce the perspective that, if informational 
problems are relevant then they should be addressed directly and the 
market allowed to achieve efficiency. 
17 
Mantel [1984] developed a model of a pure profit maximizing mono-
polist and analyzed how the firm would behave under strict liability 
and negligence. Mantel obtained a first order condition for profit 
maximization which equates marginal revenue to marginal cost plus the 
average expected cost of the accident. Mantel's first result was the 
condition under which the redistribution of income from the firm to 
the victim would be distributionally efficient or inefficient. If the 
amount of money transferred from the firm to the victims was less than 
the change in consumer suppliers which resulted from the rise in price 
and the fall in quantity, then the change in the rule of liability was 
d . "b . 11 . ff" . 22 lstrl utlona y lne lClent. A second result was that output will 
be larger under negligence relative to strict products liability only 
if the sum of the conditional probability of an accident and adverse 
judgement is less than one. The most interesting of Mantel's conclu-
sions was that consumers, as a group, may suffer a net reduction in 
their welfare from the imposition of a rule intended for their 
b f . 23 ene lt. 
Epple and Raviv [1978] analyze a general situation in which 
liability rules, market structure, information and insurance are al-
lowed to vary. They assume that the manufacturer determines the 
safety features of the product, taking consumer behavior into consid-
eration. Their conclusions are 1) that when information is perfect 
and insurance actuarially fair then product safety characteristics 
tend to be independent of market structure or the rule of liability, 
2) if either information or insurance is imperfect then no liability 
rule is universally "acceptable," 3) a general rule is that consumer 
liability is preferred when consumers are able to judge the safety 
18 
characteristics with reasonable accuracy but producer liability other-
. 24 
w~se. 
Polinsky and Rogerson [1984] developed a model of products liabil-
ity with imperfect consumer information and variable market power. 
The producer determined the probability of failure, consumers were 
risk neutral and social welfare was the surplus to consumer's net pro-
duction costs. Their results were 1) that under strict liability the 
"optimal" probability of an accident will be provided, 2) under negli-
gence, if the correct standard is chosen, then the socially optimal 
level of care is provided and, relative to strict liability and de-
pending on market structure, quantity rises, and 3) under no liability 
firms choose that level of care which minimizes perceived full costs 
and provide a larger quality, depending on market structure. Polinsky 
and Rogerson pointed out the possibly counterproductive nature of in-
creasing producer liability in the presence of monopoly power. The 
distortion which results from monopoly power can be reinforced by 
greater producer liability resulting in a net fall in "social 
welfare." 
Grahm and Pierce [1985] construct a model of products liability 
which incorporates irreplaceable losses, both producer and consumer 
influences on accident probabilities, insurance markets and 
conditional information. The desired "social optimum" is that which 
minimizes the total accident costs (avoidance costs and losses). Con-
tingent damages are calculated to equate consumer utility in the past 
accident situation to what they expected it to be, when there is a 
difference between consumer perceptions and reality. The result of 
interest is that the "optimal" liability rule retains the appearance 
19 
of a negligence rule but derives from the Hand Rule. Contingent 
damages are awarded to the injured which compensate the injured only 
for the marginal changes in safety for which the negligence are re-
sponsible. 
Section 5: Discussion 
The general analysis of response curves has been excluded from 
h . d" . f d 1" b"l" 25 t ~s ~scuss~on o pro ucts ~a ~ ~ty. When a market exists, 
parties are able to signal each other by varying prices and purchases 
in a manner which provides for their mutual benefit. If perfect com-
petition and perfect information are present, that level of care which 
maximizes utility will be provided, thus, when a market transaction 
occurs both parties in the transaction gain. This implies that the 
appropriate framework is that of Oi (1973) and Spence (1977) as op-
posed to Brown (1973). 
The analysis in this chapter does not attempt to survey the vast 
literature which has developed around the general issue of liability, 
but focuses on those analyses which address products liability 
specifically. The most important of these are Oi [1973] and Spence 
[1977]. These illustrate the main issues involved in products liabil-
ity, the role of the market, information and the rule of liability. 
They also illustrate the largest potential weakness of the analysis to 
date, the failure to include the consumer's impact on potential 
losses. Hamada [1978] and Grahm and Pierce [1984] attempt to remedy 
this shortcoming. The model developed in Chapter 3 also attempts to 
relax this restriction, and while it is not a complete model of lia-
bility, it does illustrate the potential ambiguities involved when 
both the producer and consumer can influence losses. 
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CHAPTER III 
A MODEL OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
The analysis of the impact of products liability has usually been 
characterized by looking at the situation in which the producer deter-
mines the risk involved in consumption. This chapter develops a 
simple analysis of consumer behavior when the consumer influences the 
risk involved in consumption. The purpose of this analysis is to pro-
vide a quantitative analysis of what would seem to be intuitively 
clear - that as the benefits of providing "care" fall, the provision 
of "care" falls. This model looks at the situation exclusively from 
the consumer's perspective. The analysis develops a model which al-
lows the determination of the sign of the derivative of care with re-
spect to the rule of liability. In this situation the most plausible 
result is that as the burden of liability is shifted to the producer, 
care by the consumer will fall. A second and unexpected result is 
that worktime may also fall as the burden of liability is shifted to 
the producer. 
Section 1: A General Formulation of the Model. 
The first question which must be answered in the development of a 
model of products liability concerns the provision of care by con-
sumers. Specifically, what is the form and impact of the provision of 
care by consumers? There are, generally speaking, three forms which 
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this care may take: (1) nominal expenditures by the consumer in an 
effort to reduce risk, (2) the allocation of time to being careful, 
and (3) a direct allocation of utility in some form of "awareness" or 
"watchfulness" to the reduction of risk. Of these three the most 
plausible is the allocation of time to being careful. Nominal expend-
itures are possible, but it seems unlikely that consumers would pur-
chase a product and then spend more to make it safe. The direct pro-
vision of utility is also possible, but the difficulties of including 
this in a model of consumer behavior tend to reduce its usefulness as 
far as model building is concerned. The focus of this analysis will 
thus be on the allocation of time in an effort to reduce risks. 
A second question which must be addressed is what is the source 
of utility? Utility results from consumption, but what is consump-
tion? Does it deal exclusively with the goods which are available? 
Consumption exists in the form of various activities which generate 
"1' 1 Utl lty. Each utility-generating activity requires the input of var-
ious goods and services and time allocated to consumption. Some ac-
tivities can require almost exclusively time, such as exercise, while 
others can require various goods or services as well as time, such as 
dining out. The various possible consumption activities will be char-
acterized by a vector [Z.] where Z. is the ith consumption activity. 
l l 
Each Z. re- quires input of certain goods, characterized by the vector 
l 
[Xij] which is the amount of the jth good used in consumption activity 
i, and the input of time, as designated by t. where the i designates 
l 
the consumption activity i. Utility, which is a function of consump-
tion activities, is thus 
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u U([Z.([X .. ], t.)]). 
~ ~J ~ 
(3.1) 
For this basic framework to be extended to allow for potential 
product failure, each product will have a positive probability of 
failure. The maximization of expected utility requires the summation 
of each potential level of utility multiplied by its respective prob-
ability of occurrence. If K. is the probability of no failure of one 
J 
of the X .. , and the total consumption of X. is 
~J J 
X. 
J 
n 
:z 
i=l 
X •. , lJ (3.2) 
then the probability of successfully sampling X. units of good j is 
J 
n 
[. :Zl X .. 
~= ~J 
11". 
J 
[X.) 
=K.(t s) J 
J c' 
(3.3) 
where t is time allocated to safety by the consumer and s is the al-
e 
location of money to care by the producer. Thus, the probability of 
being at the no accident level of utility, U, is 
m 
II 
j=l 
[X.) 
J 
1r (t ,s) 
j c 
(3.4) 
If each failure generates the same post-accident utility function, V, 
such that 
V· = V([Z.([X .. ], t.)J) 
~ ~J ~ 
(3.5) 
and if repeated failures do not impact this utility function, expected 
utility is 
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[X.] 
EU [J. g1 11'. ( t , s) J ] U ( [ Z. ( [X .. ] , t. ) ]) J c ]_ lJ ]_ 
[X.] 
+ [1 - . ~l 11' • ( t , s) J J V ( [ Z . ( [X .. ] , t . ) ] ) . J = J c ]_ lJ ]_ (3.6) 
The consumer will maximize utility subject to time and budget 
contraints, which are, respectively: 
and 
where 
m 
2: 
j=l 
t + 
w 
P.X. 
J J 
m n 
~ ~ 
j=l i=l 
t • w, 
w 
t .. + ClJ 
n 
~ 
i=l 
t. 
]_ 
T total amount of time available. 
t time allocated to work. 
w 
t. 
]_ 
t .. ClJ 
P. 
J 
time allocated to 
time allocated to 
ith activity. 
price of the jth 
w wage rate. 
consumption 
care in the 
good. 
s producer's provision of care. 
in 
use 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
the ith activity. 
of the j th good in the 
The consumer will maximize expected utility across t , t .. and t. W ClJ l 
(and if the assumption of a perfectly competitive constant cost indus-
try is made, also across s). 2 Without making certain simplifying as-
sumptions the analysis becomes unwieldy with 2(m • n) + n + 1 first-
order conditions. 
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Section 2: A Simplified Model. 
The first simplifying assumption is that there is only one con-
sumption activity. This allows the restatement of the utility func-
tions as 
u (3.9) 
and 
(3.10) 
where t 1 is time allocated to leisure. 
The second simplifying assumption is that there is only one good 
used in the consumption activity. This alters the budget constraint 
so that 
p . X t . w 
w 
(3.11) 
or 
t . w 
X w w p t p w (3.12) 
This in turn allows the specification of utility as a function of work 
time and leisure time. In this analysis 
t . w 
u U( w p tl) (3.13) 
and 
t . w 
v V( w p tl). (3.14) 
the time constraint can be restated as 
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tl = T - t - t w c (3.15) 
and used to eliminate tl' resulting in 
t . w 
u U( w T t ) - t -p w c (3 .16) 
and 
t . w 
v V( w T t ) . - t -p w c (3.17) 
When the simplifications are incorporated the probability of an acci-
dent becomes 
1r(t , s) 
c 
[t • w 
w 
(3.18) 
and thus, expected utility can be stated as a function of two vari-
ables, t and t , or as 
w c 
[ t • w 
w 
EU 1r(t , s) 
c 
p U(tw • w T - t - t ) P' c w 
+ (1 - 1r(t , s) 
c 
[t • w 
w 
Section 3: Inclusion of Liability. 
) V(tw • w T- t - t ). P' c w (3.19) 
The liability burden, L, consists of the post-accident share of 
the cost of an accident. For the purpose of this analysis it shall be 
continuous and between zero and one, inclusive, or 
0 :::::; L :::::; 1. (3.20) 
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The burden of liability states the portion of the cost of the accident 
in nominal terms, C, to be absorbed by the producer. The cost of the 
accident is determined by setting C such that 
(3-21) 
This compensation is received by the consumer only in the post-accid-
ent situation. Liability is thus included only in the post-accident 
utility function so that V becomes 
v V(t ~ + L • C T- t - t ). 
w P P' w c (3.22) 
As the producer's burden of liability rises the post-accident 
level of utility will approach the nonaccident level of utility, or 
Lim V 
1.=>1 
u. 
Thus, we know 
or 
aEU > O 
aL 
(1 - 1r(t ,s) 
c 
The second derivative 
(1 - 1r(t ,s) 
c 
[t • 
w 
is 
[t • 
w 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
w 
J p )V c > 0. (3.25) . 
m 
w 
p 
)Vmm 
2 (3.26) . c < 0, 
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as long as there is a diminishing marginal utility of income in the 
post-accident situation. The consumer's allocation of time to care 
can be analyzed under full producer liability by noting that when L 
1, 
u v· 
' 
(3.27) 
thus, expected utility becomes 
Since 
EU 
au 
at 
c 
[t . 
1r(t , s) 
c 
[ t • 
(1r(t , s) 
c 
u. 
au 
at1 
w [ t • p 
u + (1 - 1r(t ,s) 
c 
w [ t • w p p 
+ 1 - 1r(t , s) c 
ut (-1) < o 
L 
w l p ) u (3.28) 
l 
) u 
(3.29) 
the consumer provides no care when the producer is fully liable. 3 
Section 4: Consumer's Response to Changes in Liability. 
This section addresses the response of a consumer to a change in 
the burden of liability. Expected utility with a variable burden of 
liability is 
EU 
w 
[tw· P 
1r(t ,s)) 
c 
The consumer will maximize expected utility with respect to work time, 
t , and care time, t . The first-order conditions are 
w c 
and 
8EU 
at 
w 
8EU 
at 
c 
w [tw· p 
1r(t ,s) 
c 
w t p 1r(t ,s) w c 
[t • 
w 
[ t • 
w 
- (1 - 1r(t ,s) 
c 
w 1] p-
(U-V) 11" - 1r(t ,s) t c 
c 
w l p ) VT. 
(3.31) 
[t • w l w p 
UT 
(3.32) 
These first-order conditions represent two equations in two unknowns, 
t and t . This allows the use of the implicit function theorem and 
w c 
Cramer's rule to acquire the responsiveness of consumers to changes in 
the burden of liability in the form of the derivatives dt /dL and 
c 
dt /dL. Taking the total derivatives results in 
w 
a (8EU)dt a (aEU) dt a (aEU)dL 
at + at + aL at w at c at 
w w c w w 
or 'Yn dtw + -y12dtc + 'YlLdL 0, 
a (aEU)dt a (aEU)at a (aEU)dL 
at + at + aL at w at c at and 
w c c w c 
or 'Y21dtw + 'Y22dtc + 'Y2LdL 0. 
0 (3.33) 
(3.34) 
0 (3.35) 
(3.36) 
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Equations 3.34 and 3.35 can be restated as 
[111 112] [ dtw J [ =11L J dL. (3.37) ~'21 1'22 dtc ~'2L 
Applying Cramer's rule to 3.37 yields 
--ylL 1'12 
dt 
--y2L 1'22 --ylL ~'22 - ~'12(--y2L) w (3.38) dL ~'u 1'12 ~'u ~'22 - ~'21~'12 
'Y 'Y 
21 22 
and 
~'u --ylL 
dt 1'21 --y2L 'Y 11 ( --y 2L) - 1'21(--ylL) c (3.39) dL ~'u ~'12 ~'11~'22 - ~'12~'21 
1'21 1'22 
The signs of these derivatives are the items of interest. The prob-
lems involved in signing these derivatives are reduced by noting that 
the second-order conditions for the maximization of expected utility 
are 
and 
2 
(a EU) • 
at 2 
w 
4 With symmetry 3.41 becomes 
a2 EU 2 (---) > 0, 
at at 
w c 
(3.40) 
(3. 41) 
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34 
Thus the denominator in 3.38 and 3.39 is positive. In order to deter-
mine the signs of dtc/dL and dtw/dL' the signs of ~lL' ~ 2L and, with 
symmetry, ~21 or ~12 must by calculated. Since 
~lL 
w [tw • p J 
C[(l-7r(t ,s) )(V • wp 
c mm 
VT ) -7r(t , s) 
m c 
can be rewritten as 
~lL 
Thus, the sign of IlL is determined solely by 
w [tw• p 
[t • w 
w w p [t • ] av al-7r(t ,s) 
(l-7r(tc' s) w p ) am + ___ c_,a,_t ___ mm 
m w 
If 
[ t • w J w p [ t • l av w ) p a (1-71" (t 's) > w ) m c 0, (l-7r(t ,s) 
-a- + at v c m < 
(+) (~) w (+) + 
then 
Rearranging 3.46 yields 
(3.43) 
ln7rV ] 
m 
(3.44) 
(3.45) 
(3.46) 
(3.46a) 
w [ t • p l 
8(1-n(t ,s) w ) 
c --------~87t __________ vm 
w 
w [ t • l 
Dividing both sides by (1-n(t ,s) w p ) 
c 
V results in 
m 
[t • w l 
av ml8m 
w p ) 18t 8(1-n(t ,s) 
> c w 
< [ t • w l w p ) v (1-n(t ,s) 
m c 
av 1a 
m 
av IV 1 m 1 ( m m) . (-) ( m m) 77v v m a m m 
m mlm m 
With 
f It · w w - l [ t • p 8(1-n(tc,s) w p w 
and 
equation 3.48 
m 
77v 
m 
(1) 
1 
t 
w 
becomes 
~ ~ [-m <
) I (1-n(t , s) 
c 
t 
w 
at 1t w w 
w [ t • 
(1-n(t ,s) w p 
c 
1 t w 
t 17 
w 
1-n(t ,s) 
c 
(+) 
[ t • 
w J w p 
I] 1 
t 
w 
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(3.47) 
(3.48) 
(3. 49) 
(3.50) 
(3.51) 
y 
where 11x refers to the elasticity of X with respect to Y. Equation 
3.51 provides the technical condition for the determination of the 
sign of ~lL but provides no basis for specifying this sign. We know 
from 3.31 that 
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a aEU a aEU am2 
I'lL aL (at) am2 (at) aL ' (3.53) w w 
or that I'lL 
_a -caEu) 
am2 atw c. (3.54) 
Equation 3.54 states that the sign of I'lL depends on the impact of 
changing post-accident income on the expected marginal utility of in-
creasing work time, t . A change in t affects utility in three ways: 
w w 
(1) by increasing income, and thus increasing expected utility, (2) by 
increasing the probability of an accident and thus reducing expected 
utility and (3) by reducing leisure time or care time and thus reduc-
ing expected utility. A change in the burden of liability affects 
expected utility only through the change in the post-accident level of 
income. If the post-accident marginal utility of income is diminish-
ing then the marginal expected utility of income would be diminishing 
as well. This, in turn, implies that since the first effects impact 
is falling and the other two remain constant then the net impact would 
be negative, thus I'lL< 0. 
With 
w 
C(-tw • p 
w [tw• p -1] 
n(t ,s) n V 
c t 1 m 
and with all terms positive, 1'2L is less than zero. The last term to 
. a aEu a aEu 
be determined ~s 1 21 (=at (at)) or 1'12 (= at (at)). Taking the 
c w w c 
derivative of either of the first-order conditions with respect to the 
other variables results in 
where t • w 
w 
T - t - t . 
w c 
t •w+L•C 
w 
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This gives the three ways in which work time effects utility. The 
first occurs as a result of increasing income. The second influences 
expected utility through a change in the probability of an accident. 
The third influences expected utility as a result of reducing leisure 
time. The second two have a negative impact on expected utility while 
the first is positive. 3EU The impact of a change in tc on ~ can be 
w 
analyzed by looking at each of the respective changes. 
An increase in t reduces the probability of an accident, ceteris 
c 
paribus. This results in a decrease in the importance of the post ac 
. d 1 1 f ·1· d . h. . . . fl a EU c~ ent eve o ut~ ~ty an s~nce t ~s ~s a negat~ve ~n uence, ~
w 
would be expected to rise. Since everything else is constant the 
other two factors would not be influenced. As t rises the probabil-
c 
ity of an accident falls and expected utility will approach the no-ac-
cident level of utility. This also implies that the marginal expected 
utility of income will approach the non-accident level of marginal 
utility of income. As long as the post-accident marginal utility of 
income is smaller than the non-accident level of marginal utility of 
income, ~21 > 0. The signs of the derivatives can now be specified. 
With 
and if 
~11' ~22 < O, 
~11~22 - ~21~12 > o, 
~lL < O, 
~2L < O, 
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[ t • w 
-1] 
[~ 1r(t ,s) w p 1'21 1'12 7rt p c c 
[t • w 
-1] 
w w p ) ln1r] (U-V) + t p (1r(t , s) 7rt w c 
c 
[ ( t • w 
-1)] 
w p w [w(Um- Vm) + (VT- UT)] + t p 1r(t ,s) 7rt w c 
c 
[ t • w l [ t • w l w p ln 1r(UT - v ) w p ) (V • w 
- VTT) - 1r(t ,s) - (l-1r(t ,s) c T c Tm p 
[ t • w l p w w (-U (3.56) + 'll'(t ,s) • P + UTT). c mT 
Equation 3.57 clearly illustrates that ,.21 is dependent on the changes 
in post-accident marginal utilities, changes in probability and 
changes in marginal utilities. In general terms 
1'12 
a CaEu) 
at at · (3.57) 
c w 
Expected utility can be stated as a function of three functions of t . 
w 
Thus 
EU f(1r, U, V), (3.58) 
while two of these are each functions of two functions of t which 
w 
yields 
EU (3.59) 
39 
~'12 "21 > o, 
dt 
- I'Ll/' 22 - 1' 12 ( --y 2 L) 
then w < 0 dL (3.60) 
"n"22 - "12"21 
and 
dt 
"n<-"22) - 1'21(--ylL) c 0. dL < 
"n"22 - ,.21,.12 
(3.61) 
As the burden of liability is shifted from the consumer to the 
producer the provision of care and the time worked will tend to fall. 
The result with respect to the time allocated to care is intuitively 
clear, as liability shifts to the producer the benefit from the addi-
tional unit of care tends to fall, thus reducing the incentive to 
provide care. The result with respect to the provision of work time 
is neither intuitively clear nor readily acceptable without further 
analysis. 
Despite the 
appealing result 
strong intuitive appeal of ,. 21 > 0, and the equally 
dt 
c 
that dL < 0, a more detailed consideration must be 
given to the structural relationships yielded by equations 3.38 and 
3.39: 
dt 
w 
dL 
dt 
c 
dL 
--ylL/'22- ~'21(--y2L) 
2 
1 l11 22 - (-y21) 
1 11 (--y2L) - ~'21 (--ylL) 
2 
"n1 22 - (1'21) 
(3.62) 
(3.38) 
(3.63) 
(3.39) 
Since ,. 21 has an ambiguous sign, each equation will, in turn, be ana-
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lyzed with respect to changes in ~21 . Equation 3.38 can be restated 
as 
dt 
w 
dL 
(3.64) 
First, let ~21 0. This renders the point where 
~21 
dt 
w 
0, and dL 
and a slope at this point of 
slope 
~lL 
~11 ~22 
< 0. 
Thus when ~21 = 0 there is a negative slope. 
acquired by analyzing the value of ~21 which 
yields 
or 
~21 < O. 
(3.65) 
(3.66) 
A second point can be 
dt 
w 
sets dL = 0. This 
(3.67) 
The final relationship that allows the specification of the general 
slope of equation 3.65 is the second-order condition which is (as 
noted in 3.42) 
41 
This gives the upper and lower bound of 7 21 as 
and 
The limit of the denominator of either the intercept or the slope of 
3.65 approaches zero at either extreme. For 
the 
Lim 
7 21 - > .jr--7-1-1 7-2-2 
- 00 (3.68) 
For 
Lim 
721-> .l7n722 
+ 00 (3.69) 
if a negative 7 21 is large enough to change the overall sign of the 
second term. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
The main relationship of interest is the impact of a change in 
liability on care time. This relationship has been stated as 
dtw 
dL 
- yl2y22 
- y22 
dtw 
+-dL 
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- y21 + /ylly22 ----~====--~~-------l------------------~~-----+ y21 
dtw dtw 
dL dL 
FIGURE 3 
If ,.21 
dt 
if c dL 
0 
dt 
c 
dL 
then 
0 then 
dt 
-1'2L c 
--dL 1 22 
1' ll ( -1' 2 L) 
43 
(-1'2L) 
< 0 with a slope of - < 0. Likewise 
1n 1 22 
- (-l'lL)/'21 0 which yields 
dt 
w The limits are the same for dL and are determined by the second-order 
condition, thus 
and 
Lim 
1'21 -> + 
Lim 
1'21 -> -
- co 
+ co 
dt 
c The relationship between dL and ,.21 is illustrated in Figure 4. 
There are two possible results which are of interest, each of 
which deals with the horizontal intercepts. The first is 
This is illustrated in Figure V. Where this is the situation, 
dt 
c de both will initially be positive and falling as ,.21 rises. 
dt 
w gt and 
w 
de 
dt 
c 
dL 
dt 
c 
dL 
FIGURE 4 
+ /y y 11 22 
44 
45 
dt 
c 
will be negative and de positive over the range AB in Figure 3. Both 
will be negative for ~21 >B. The results are summarized in Table I. 
Figure 4 illustrates the situation in which 
~11 [ =~~~ l < ~22 [ =~~~ l· 
These results are summarized in Table II. The information in Tables I 
and II indicates that work time and care time could be seen as being 
both positive or negative or as having different signs with respect to 
liability. 
Section 5: Discussion 
When expected losses depend on the provision of care by the con-
sumer, a shift of the burden of liability to the producer will result 
in the reduction of care by the consumer. This result is intuitively 
attractive. As the gains from any activity are reduced, participation 
in the activity would be expected to fall; thus as the potential 
benefit from the provision of care falls the consumer will provide 
less care. 
The model in this chapter was developed with the intention of 
illustrating the complexity of the decision making process. To com-
plete the analysis, each activity, good and use of time must be spe-
cified, as well as a distribution of accidents which might occur for 
each product in each activity. The inclusion of information distor-
tion and deviations from the competitive norm as an explicit specifi-
cation of producer behavior must be included to give accurate, quanti-
TABLE I 
SIGNS OF DERIVATIVES WITH A > B. 
IF 
-71~ J dt < '¥22 w '¥21 
--y2L dL 
[ -71L [ =72L J dt < '¥21 < 'Yn w '¥22 
--y2L dL < 'YlL 
[ =72L} dt w 'Yn '¥21 dL ' 
'YlL 
TABLE II 
SIGNS OF DERIVATIVES WITH B > A. 
IF 
dt 
w 
dL 
dt 
c 
dL < 
722 [ =~~~} 121 dt c. dL ' 
THEN 
dt 
c 
> 0 dL 
dt 
o· 
' 
c 
dL > 
dt 
c 
dL < 0 
THEN 
dt 
c 
> 0 dL 
dt 
o· 
' 
w 
dL > 
dt 
w 
dL < O 
46 
0 
0 
dt 
c 
dL 
FIGURE 5 
47 
dt dt 
c w 
+dL'+dL 
48 
dt dt 
c, + w 
+ dL dL 
- y21----~~==~----~~---------------+----­dt 
w 
dL 
FIGURE 6 
fiable results. A casual merging of the model in this chapter and 
previous analyses is, however, possible. 
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The first issue is that of information imperfections. If the 
consumer sees no risk to consumption, he would not, rationally, pro-
vide care. If the distortion is not complete then he may still pro-
vide care, but at a lower level than if he were fully informed. The 
consumer may also overestimate the risk. If this is the situation 
then the consumer could well provide more care than under full inform-
ation. 
Spence [1977] has indicated that there are also potential distor-
tions in the marginal conditions. If the consumer sees the risk 
higher than is the case and underestimates his productivity of care, 
he could provide more or less care than the full information level. 
When the producer is included the same types of ambiguities that ex-
isted in Spence's analysis could occur. As the burden of liability is 
shifted to the producer and as long as the consumer sees this as re-
ducing his potential loss, the consumer will provide less care. The 
producer's costs rise by the increased compensation and thus producer 
care would be expected to rise. Will products be more or less safe? 
This is unknown and will depend on the productivity of care by pro-
ducers and consumers and the changes in their level of care. In the 
general situation in which both producers and consumers influence 
accidents, a change in liability from no liability will have an ambig-
uous result. 
Monopoly would be expected to introduce another distortion into 
the analysis. In addition to the provision of a smaller quantity, the 
monopolist might attempt to discriminate on the basis of information, 
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risk preferences and potential losses. Different levels of care could 
be provided with the monopolist setting price and attempting to seg-
ment the market on the basis of these different levels of care. 
An analysis of the impact of varying liability rules is the pur-
pose of this research. The analysis in this chapter indicates that 
the impact of these changes cannot be specified without consideration 
of a number of factors tangentially related to the consideration of 
products liability. The total impact is ambiguous. A final point is 
that while consumers are "best" off under absolute liability, as far 
as their losses from accidents are concerned, their expected utility 
would fall. This occurs as a result of the market relationship which 
exists between the producer and the consumer. If the consumer can 
increase his expected utility by purchasing care from the producer, he 
will do so. Thus, for the producer to increase care beyond the no-li-
ability level, the implication is that the nominal value of the rise 
in expected utility is less than the expenditure on care by the pro-
ducer. For the "optimum" to be achieved both the producer and con-
sumer must provide those levels of care which maximize expected util-
ity. If the consumer is misinformed, he will not provide the appro-
priate level of care, thus no remedy which is based solely on adjust-
ing the incentives of the producer to provide care will achieve this 
"optimum," because it will not bring forth the correct level of con-
sumer care. The estimation of the impact variations in liability on 
product-related accidents will be presented in Chapter 5. 
CHAPTER III 
ENDNOTES 
1Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time" Economic 
Journal Vol. 74, No. 295 (September 1965), pp 493-517. 
2The assumption of perfect competition is made by both Oi and 
Spence. For a specification of the norms of perfect competition see 
P.R.G. Layred and A.A. Walters. Microeconomic Theory. McGraw Hill 
Book Company, New York, New York, 1978. 
3This result is intuitively clear. If the consumer only loses as 
a result of providing care, he will not provide care. The implication 
with respect to the provision of work time is not as intuitively 
clear. The consumer is in the process of maximizing expected utility, 
thus, the marginal utility of time is the same across uses. The shift 
of the burden of liability shifts the marginal utilities of both care 
time and work time, thus altering both uses. 
4 Layred and \\falters, Chapter 5. 
51 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF LIABILITY 
The purpose of this analysis is to test the impact of liability 
rules on product-related accidents. In order to accomplish this the 
changes in the rule of liability which occurred must be specified. 
This chapter maps the historical progression of products liability 
with emphasis on the changing rule of liability. Liability has passed 
1 through four phases. These phases, while distinct within a state, do 
not occur simultaneously in all states. These phases will be gener-
ally identified in this chapter, with the state by state specification 
left to table I. Table I identifies the statutes or cases which mark 
the shift from one rule of liability to another. The dates in this 
table form the basis of the primary independent variable which is of 
interest. 
Section 1: Privity 
The first phase of products liability was defined by the Winter-
bottom v. Wright2 decision. This case clearly established the need 
for privity in contract as a prerequisite for the collection of da-
mages. With privity the producer was responsible only to the immedi-
ate buyer of the product, and was thus insulated from any consumer who 
purchased the product from an intermediary to which the product was 
sold. This prevented a producer who sold a product to an intermediary 
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from being responsible for damages to the consumer which resulted from 
the failure of the product. 
Changes in tort are often seen as reversals of previously held 
doctrine. This is not necessarily the case in the area of products 
liability. 3 While Wright v. Winterbottom established the general am-
4 bience for products liability prior to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
its erosion had started as early as 1837. The erosion of Wright v. 
Winterbottom can be seen most clearly through a series of exceptions 
to the privity requirement. The first exception was established by 
5 Langridge v. ~ in 1837. This case dealt with the sale of a gun to 
the plaintiff for use by his son. The producer of the gun was inten-
tionally incorrectly identified by the seller of the gun. The gun 
exploded resulting in the loss of the son's hand. This case estab-
lished that a person could recover damages if a product which is known 
to be imminently dangerous is delivered without notice of its quali-
ties. Epstein [1980] has noted two "implicit limitations" to the rule 
as established in Langridge v. ~· The first was that it applied 
only to the "real party in interest," in this situation, the son. If 
the gun had been used by anyone else the rule would fail. The second 
implicit limitation was that "only fraud would carry the day for the 
plaintiff." 6 Epstein [1980] pointed out that this knowledge require-
ment was particularly harsh and was substantially eroded by the time 
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 
The second exception was stated most accurately by Thomas v. Win-
chester.7 This case concerned the purchase of belladonna which had 
been mislabeled as dandelion extract. The producer's employee mis-
labeled the belladonna which was sold to a druggist. The belladonna 
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was then purchased by the plaintiff's husband and used by the plain-
tiff. Clearly privity did not exist. The court overcame this by 
noting that "the sale of the substance in its original container 
created an 'imminent danger' only to the ultimate user of the 
8 product." In this situation the danger came from placing a product 
which is inherently dangerous, here belladonna, into the stream of 
commerce. The factor which distinguishes this from the first exclu-
sion is that there was no knowledge on the part of the producer 
involved that the belladonna had been mislabeled, and thus no fraud 
was involved. 
The third exclusion to the privity rule was established by Devlin 
v. Smith, 9 in 1882. This involved the collapse of scaffolding which 
was deemed unable to support the required weight. The scaffolding was 
supplied by Stevenson to Smith for use by Smith's employees. With no 
relationship between the employee, Devlin, and Stevenson the privity 
limitation was in effect. The situation in Devlin v. Smith and Thomas 
v. winchester are, in causal terms, very similar. Epstein [1980] 
points out that the only meaningful difference is that belladonna 
operates on the internal chemistry of the individual while the defec-
tive scaffolding causes injury by allowing the individual to fall from 
great heights. 
These exceptions were summarized in Huset v. ~ Case Threshing 
Co. as: 
The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer or 
vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of 
mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of 
an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human 
life, is actionable by third parties who suffer from the neg-
ligence. 
The second exception is that an owner's act of negligence which 
causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective 
appliance upon the owner's premises may form the basis of an ac-
tion against the owner. 
The third exception to the rule is that one who sells or de-
livers an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to 
life or limb to another without notice of its qualities is 
liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which 
might have been reasonably anticipated, whether t~0re were any 
contractual relations between the parties or not. 
It is clear from the above that elements of negligence had crept 
into products liability prior to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co .. 
Indeed, Judge Sarborn stated the first two exceptions explicitly in 
terms of negligence, while the third sounds like a failure to warn. 
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The shift from privity to negligence is best thought of as having been 
a gradual shift with several small shifts in the form of a series of 
exceptions followed by a somewhat larger shift in MacPherson, which 
finally established the rule of negligence. 
Section 2: Negligence 
The rejection of the privity requirement was completed in 
MacPherson v.Buick Motor Co., which established negligence as a rule 
for recovery. The MacPherson case involved the collapse of a wheel 
while the automobile was in motion. The plaintiff was thrown from the 
car and injured. Judge Cardoza escaped the requirement of privity by 
noting two issues of "immediate and paramount importance." The first 
was whether the vendor knew that the product would be used by the 
plaintiff even though he was not the immediate purchaser. The second 
issue was whether the product was dangerous. On the basis of these 
two issues the rule of negligence was established. 
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h 1 f 1 . d d · state by 1966. 11 T e ru e o neg ~gence was a opte ~n every 
Keeton et al., [1984] list three general ways a producer can be negli-
gent. These are: 
(1) "Negligent in creating or failing to discover a flaw." 12 
(2) "Negligent in failing to warn or failing to adequately 
warn." 
13 
(3) 14 "Negligent in the sale of a defectively designed product." 
Negligence is defined more generally as, " doing of something 
that a person of ordinary prudence would not have done in the same or 
similar circumstances or a failure to do something that the person of 
d . d ld h d 0 h . IllS or ~nary pru ence wou ave one ~n t e same c~rcumstances. While 
negligence is typically still available as a theory of recovery, it 
has been generally supplanted by the theory of strict liability in 
tort. Brown [1973], in a general analysis of liability, stated the 
negligence rule as 
0 1 if X > Xk 
~(X,Y) ~(X,Y) ( 
1 0 if X < X* 
where LX is the liability of the producer, (injurer), ~the liability 
of the "victim," with X andY the levels of care by the producer and 
"victim," respectively. X* is the due-care standard for the 
producer. with the adoption of a generally applicable rule of negli-
gence, the liability burden of producers would be expected to rise. 
This, in and of itself, may not have much effect on the provision of 
care. with a system as described in chapter two where the risk in-
volved in the consumption of a good influences the demand and supply 
of a good, the system may already be at something very much resembling 
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a "Coasian" equilibrium with the exact characteristics of a good with 
respect to risky consumption determined through a market process with 
consumers maximizing utility and producers maximizing profit. 16 
There are two parameters to any behavior-specific system of pro-
ducts liability. The first is the rule of liability, such as negli-
gence, strict liability or comparative liability. Once the rule of 
liability is established the due-care standard must be determined. 
Under a rule of negligence the producer is required to provide care of 
a specified level in order to escape liability; this is the due-care 
standard for the producer. As this standard becomes higher, the 
negligence rule will converge with strict liability. As this due-care 
standard falls, the rule will approach no liability. The courts can 
specify care standards on an ad hoc basis for different products in a 
manner which could result in some products covered approximately by 
strict liability, while the coverage of others approximates no liabil-
ity. 
The evolution of products liability from negligence to strict lia-
bility has illustrated this situation. Epstein [1980] points out that 
the changes in liability with respect to food evolved in this manner. 
It was, and is, held by the courts that producers of food should 
provide the highest possible level of care. The use of a highest pos-
sible care standard can come precariously close to strict liability in 
17 
tort. The removal of industry custom as setting the benchmark for 
care also hastened the erosion of the negligence standard. 18 
A second method by which the rule of negligence converged with 
strict products liability concerned the evidentiary rule of res ipsa 
loquitor. This doctrine applies to situations where no direct evi-
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dence of negligence is shown but where an unusual accident occurred 
which would probably not have occurred if proper care had been pro-
vided by the defendant. In this situation the defendant is negligent 
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. Keeton et al. [1984] state 
f d . . 19 f . 1' . our con ltlons or lts app lcatlon: 
(1) "The event must be of the kind which woul20ordinarily not 
occur in the absence of someone's negligence." 
(2) "It must be caused by an agency2 ~r instrumentality within 
exclusive control of the defendant." 
(3) "It must not have been due to any volu"2~ary action or 
contribution on the part of the plaintiff." 
(4) "That evidence as to the true explanation of the event 
must be mor2 3readily accessible to the defendant than the 
plaintiff." 
Epstein [1980] used Richenbacker v. California Packing Corpora-
. 
24 'll h . l . f . l . l tlon to l ustrate t e lnc uslon o res lpsa oqultor products ia-
bility. This case involved the presence of a large piece of glass in 
canned spinach. The plaintiff demonstrated that it could not have 
been introduced as a result of their failure to provide due care. It 
was decided that even though there was no specific evidence of the 
defendant's negligence, the glass could not have been introduced ex-
cept while the defendant was in control; thus the defendant was li-
able. The presence of the defect is sufficient, with proof that the 
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, to establish the defend-
ant's negligence. Prosser and Keeton [1984) indicated that this doc-
trine can also be probabilistically used if it seems more probable 
that the defendant was negligent. 
The movement of negligence towards strict products liability is 
shown clearly in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 25 Despite extensive 
evidence by the defendant that due care was provided, the plaintiff 
26 
was successful. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor was evidently a 
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controlling factor in the decision. The conditions for the use of res 
ipsa loguitor, as given to the jury, were that (1) "the defendant had 
exclusive control of the thing causing the injury and (2) the accident 
is of such a nature that it ordinarily would not occur in the absence 
of negligence by the defendant." 27 Noel and Phillips [1981] pointed 
out that exclusive control can be demonstrated by showing "proper 
handling" after the product leaves the defendant's contro1. 28 In 
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 29 Justice Traynor stated that this 
brings the rule of negligence to a close approximation of strict pro-
ducts liability. Thus, under the doctrine of res ipsa loguitor and in 
the absence of negligence by the plaintiff, it would appear that as 
long as the accident would not ordinarily occur without the defend-
ant's negligence, and with no positive proof of that negligence, the 
defendant would be negligent. This second phase in the evolution of 
the structure of products liability consisted of the period of time 
from MacPherson, in 1916, to the mid-1960s and the adoption of strict 
products liability. 
Section Three: Strict Products Liability 
The doctrine of strict products liability allows recovery for 
damages caused by a product which is in a "defective condition unrea-
30 
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer." The doctrine was first 
stated in Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. 
Coca-Cola., and explicitly adopted first in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products Co. 31 in 1963. Greenman and the acceptance of strict pro-
ducts liability by the American Law Institute in the Second Restate-
ment of Torts heralded the broad acceptance of strict products liabil-
ity. Strict products liabil~ty, either section 402A of the Second 
Restatement of Torts or a rule very similar to section 402A, was ac-
cepted by forty-five states as of 1984, 32 with five others relying on 
33 
warranty. There are four generally accepted reasons for the use of 
strict products liability; 34 these are: 
(1) that it reduces the number and severity of accidents. 
(2) that some parties are "ill prepared" to meet the "over 
whelming" consequences of injuries. 
(3) that the producer can acquire insurance more readily than 
the consumer and pass it on in the form of higher prices. 
(4) that it simplifies the administration of products lia-
bility actions. 
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The first contention is that strict products liability will result 
in "safer" products. A necessary prerequisite for this is that the 
control of product safety be within the exclusive control of the pro-
ducer. There are few products which meet this general rule. As long 
as product safety is a jointly produced good with inputs from both 
users and manufacturers, each of whom receive benefit from their pro-
vision of care, any alteration in the benefit they receive from their 
own activity will reduce their incentive to participate in that activ-
ity. A change in the burden of liability from the consumer to the 
producer alters the gains to the parties involved. Specifically, 
while the producer would be expected to provide more care in an effort 
to reduce his liability burden, the consumer will provide less care 
because he receives no benefit due to the producer's liability. As 
pointed out in chapter two, the overall implications of the impact on 
product safety tends to be ambiguous, with the potential, depending on 
the exact nature of the production of care, for the frequency and 
severity of product-related accidents to either rise or fall. 
The second contention is, essentially, that producers are better 
able to absorb the large personal losses which occur as a result of 
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these accidents. The firm's "pockets" are assumed to be "deeper" than 
the consumers. The third contention involves risk spreading. The 
producer is able to encompass the cost of procuring insurance in the 
price of the good and thus spread the risk among the consumers. As 
long as the producer is the sole determinant of accident frequency and 
severity, these arguments may be acceptable. Unfortunately, these 
same two arguments can be used to rationalize absolute liability for 
all accidents involving all products. They provide no rationale to 
limit liability to defective products. 
The final contention is that it would simplify the administration 
of products liability claims. The ability to prove any party liable 
under strict products liability is more secure than under a negli-
gence. All that must be shown is that a defect was present and basi-
cally responsible for the accident. \.Jhile this simplifies the court 
process, it may well encourage more suits due to the greater ease of 
proving the producer liable. The uneven adaptation of strict products 
liability provides the opportunity to compare the impact of its adop-
tion by using cross sectional observations of product-related ac-
cidents. 
Section 4: Comparative negligence 
The final phase in the development of products liability legal 
structure essentially began with Daly v. General Motors Co. 35 in 
1978. In this case the California Supreme Court applied the principle 
of comparative negligence to strict liability in tort, thus merging 
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the two concepts. Strict liability with comparative negligence still 
holds the manufacturer liable for the damages but reduces the amount 
by the proportion of fault of the plaintiff. Courts have often fol-
lowed the lead of the state legislature in use of comparative fault 
since many states had replaced negligence by adapting a comparative 
36 
negligence statute. While California provided the meaningful start 
of the widespread· adoption of comparative negligence in strict liabil-
ity cases, it was not the first to adopt this modification. Wiscon-
. 37 N h" 38 l k 39 h 40 M" . . .41 d s~n, ew Hamps ~re, A as a, Ida o, ~ss~ss~pp~ an 
42 Nebraska had all previously adopted comparative negligence. Compar-
ative negligence has been applied to strict liability in tort in 
43 twenty-six states. Table III lists the relevant cases, statutes and 
dates. 
Comparative negligence involves the division of losses on the 
basis of the relative "responsibility" of the two parties. There are 
h 11 d h d f . h 1 44 tree genera y use met o s o separatlng t ese osses. First, is 
the pure form of comparative negligence under which a party is 
required to bear the losses of the accident in accordance to the 
"relative percentage" of his fault. 45 The second allows recovery only 
46 if the plaintiff's negligence was less than the defendant's. This 
second rule is modified in some states by allowing recovery if both 
parties are equally negligent. 47 The third, as adopted by Nebraska 
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and South Dakota, allows the plaintiff to recover if his negligence 
is "slight" while that of the defendant is "gross." The case for the 
adoption of comparative negligence is stated by Justice Spears in 
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 49 as 
... on the one hand that strict products liability is not 
absolute liability - that is, product suppliers are not in-
surers of the safety of their products. On the other hand 
'all or nothing,'strict liability defenses are outmoded and 
undesirable doctrinal throwbacks resulting in unfairness to 
plaintiffs, to defendants, and to other product purchasers who 
ultimately absorb the loss through price setting .... in the 
absence of apportionment, some manufacturers bear the total 
expense of accidents for which others are partly to blame, 
while other manufacturers totally escape liability even though 
they have sold defective products. Either result is unaccept-
able .... 
Unfairness, however, is not the only serious flaw of 
virtually ignoring plaintiff and third party misconduct in 
strict products liability actions. The failure to allocate 
accident costs in proportion to the parties' relative abil-
ities to prevent or to reduce those costs is economically in-
efficient. Special Project. Supra, at 485-86. An ideal tort 
system should impose responsibility on the parties according 
to their abilities to prevent the harm. Existing law, how-
ever, encourages manufacturers to make safety improvements 
that are not cost justified while failing to deter the sub-
standard conduct of the tort-feasors ... Id.... Thus, equitable 
and rational risk distribution, a fundamental policy underly-
ing the imposition of strict product's liability, logically 
depends on the existence of some system for comparing causa-50 
tion in cases involving plaintiff or third party misconduct. 
It is interesting to note that the court states the arguments in 
favor of comparative negligence in terms of equity and efficiency, 
both of which economists at least recognize. There are two implica-
63 
tions with respect to the efficiency contention. The first is that a 
more efficient production of safety could lead to improvements in pro-
duct safety. This, of course, may or may not be the case, depending 
on the exact nature of the production of safety. The second, and more 
obtuse, is that court costs may rise. With a comparative fault rule 
the range over which the plaintiff can collect at least partial dam-
ages will rise. Likewise, the range over which producers will opt to 
settle as opposed to going to court will shrink as they try to reduce 
their damage payments by the amount of the plaintiff's negligence. 
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While there may be fewer and less damaging accidents, more litigation 
would be anticipated. 
The legal structure of liability is the independent variable of 
interest to this analysis. The impact of changes in the structure of 
liability on observed accidents involving products is the subject of 
the analysis; thus, the legal structure of liability must be 
quantified. The change to be analyzed are the establishment of strict 
liability as the rule of liability. 
Section 5: The Defective Product51 
A product can be defective in three ways: (1) manufacture or con-
struction, (2) design and, (3) inadequate warning. A defect in the 
manufacture or construction of a product consists of a situation where 
a product fails to meet the producer's own specifications of the pro-
duct. The producer is held to his own standards, even if these are 
higher than the normal industry standards or those specified by 
statute. 
There are two problems with proving the existence of a defect. 
The first is that the defect must be traced to that point where it 
52 left the control of the defendant. This is more difficult to prove 
for a defect in manufacture than design because a design defect will 
be present throughout the product line while the defect in manufacture 
will be present only in the specific unit in question. The second 
problem deals with the causal relationship between the apparent defect 
and the accident, especially when dealing with mechanical defects. 53 
The problem is that the apparent defect may be a result of the 
f h f h "d 54 accident instead o t e cause o t e ace~ ent. 
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Keeton et al. (1984] divide the problems of proof into three evi-
dentiary types: 
(1) "evidence is introduced, usually of an expert, of an identi--
fiable flaw that could have caused the accident." 55 
(2) "when the user or someone present testifies that a component 
part malfunctions, but, for some reason, either because the 
accident destroys the evidence or the product disappears, 
there is no evidence as to an identifiable flaw that could 
have caused the accident." 56 
(3) "when the plaintiff is relying primarily on the nature of the 
accident as circumstantial evidence of a construction or mar-
keting flaw." 57 
Perhaps the most interesting point with respect to proving the pres-
ence of a manufacturing defect is that there is, usually, no need for 
direct evidence of the existence of a defect due to the fact that the 
d . 1 d 1 f h "d 58 pro uct lS a tere as a resu t o t e accl ent. 
59 The second general type of defect consists of a failure to warn. 
A product can be considered unreasonably dangerous by failing to ade-
quately warn of the dangers of using a product which are related to 
h h d d . d 60 t e way t e pro uct was eslgne . The failure to warn is specifi-
cally addressed in §402A comment (j) of the Second Restatement of 
Torts by stating that "to prevent the product from being unreasonably 
dangerous the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on 
the container, as to its use." 61 It must be emphasized that the fail-
ure to provide some minimal level of safety cannot be escaped with a 
62 
warning of the hazards involved in the consumption of the product. 
66 
Likewise, if a product is "incorrigibly unsafe" or of "doubtful value" 
. "11 ff" 1" b"l" 63 a warn~ng w~ not su ~ce to escape ~a ~ ~ty. 
Epstein [1980] points out that the duty to warn is particularly 
important when dealing with drugs and other types of chemicals. 64 The 
wrong label on a product removes the consumer from the "common pool" 
of knowledge thus making the producer responsible for the risk 
involved. Other than blatant mislabeling, there is apparently an am-
biguous demarcation between what would be considered adequate and in-
adequate information. This naturally relates to the impact of inform-
ation on the consumer's behavior. If the consumer is completely 
ignorant of the risk involved, as in Thomas v. Hinchester, he will 
behave as if there is no risk involved. In the absence of suicidal 
tendencies, it seems unlikely that a person would take belladonna. 
The more accurate the consumer's information the less likely he is to 
take untoward risks. 
The duty to warn by a producer of drugs, for example, apparently 
extends to the final consumer of the drug, in addition to the physi-
cian.65 A warning which would be otherwise adequate can be offset by 
66 
the over promotion of the drug. While strict liability and negli-
gence actions are very similar with respect to the duty to warn, they 
are different in one very important aspect. If a good is produced and 
sold with an inadequate warning, and is sold to an intermediary who 
then resells the product to its ultimate user, both will be strictly 
liable for the resultant injuries. A whole chain of intermediaries 
67 
could thus be liable for a failure to warn. 
The third, and perhaps most interesting, is the defect in design 
Keeton et al. [1984] list two approaches to the problems of a "defec-
tively" designed product. The first of these is the consumer-user 
contemplation test. A product is defectively designed if "it is dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer who purchased it with the ordinary knowledge common 
to the community as to the product's characteristics." 68 They list 
three reasons why the consumer contemplation test is not usually ade-
69 quate. The first is that it would not allow the injured party to 
recover from a design hazard that was "open" or "obvious," regardless 
of whether a safer product could have been placed on the market at a 
67 
small change in costs. This problem speaks to the stated purpose of 
70 
the courts which is to encourage safer products. The second problem 
is that it can result in a product being identified as being defec-
. 1 d l . h . 71 t~ve y angerous w~~c ~s not. The third problem deals with the 
ambiguous nature of consumer contemplation. Keeton et al. [1984] 
point out that with such an ambiguous statement of the conditions for 
recovery, the consumer contemplation test can be used to explain any 
l h . 1 . l . h 72 resu t w lC1 a partlcu ar Jury c oases. 
The second approach to a defective design is that of comparing the 
danger or harm with the utility and benefits of a product. All pro-
ducts are associated with some positive, though possibly very small, 
probability of failure. This approach recognizes that there is no way 
to evaluate the net loss or gain from the hazards of consumption with-
out including the benefits of consumption in the analysis. This test 
allows a product to be declared "unreasonably dangerous" if "a reason-
able person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foresee-
73 
able or not, outweighs the utility of the product." This conclusion 
is reached if the harm, in fact, outweighed the utility, even if a 
safer product were available or if the product could have been more 
f 1 d . d 74 sa e y es1.gne . If there is no feasible way of eliminating the 
danger [user specifications were followed or industry standards were 
met (or state of the art)], the defendant will not be held liable. 75 
68 
h 1 . . h . 11 f 1" b"l" 76 T e comp Lance wLt statute Ls genera y not an escape o La L Lty. 
A product can be defective in design, manufacture or warning. 
When an unreasonably dangerous defect is present, the producer is 
liable for the damages which result from the use of the product. 
Section 6: Discussion 
There are many other characteristics of products liability than a 
rule of liability and a standard of care. These include the consist-
f d . 77 h l"d" f . . d ency o ver Lets, t eva 1. Lty o statutes restraLnLng amage 
d 78 f "d "f" . 79 1" b"l" f awar s, manu acturer L entL LcatLon, La 1. Lty o successor cor-
. 80 d h . 81 poratLons an many ot er Lssues. A detailed analysis of these is 
beyond the scope of this research and readily available elsewhere. 82 
Products liability is primarily a tort-developed set of rules 
which were developed on a state-by-state basis. This is not to say 
that there has been no legislative activity in this area. Herman 
[1983] provides an overview of this legislative activity, which is 
summarized in Table IV. 
The statute of repose is the amount of time during which the manu-
facturer can be held liable for accidents. The statute of repose is 
generally between eight and twelve years. A statute of repose is a 
limit on the liability of the manufacturer. The shorter the statute 
of repose, the lower the burden of manufacturer liability. A second 
area of legislative activity is a statute of limitations. This limits 
69 
the time after an injury is known to have occurred for which the pro-
ducer is liable. In addition to statutes of repose and limitations, 
products liability statutes often include certain presumptions or de-
fenses. The most common of these concern, 1) state of the art 
defenses, 2) alteration or modification of the product, 3) compliance 
with government statutes or regulations and 4) the assumption of 
risk. Comparative negligence as applied to negligence has been 
usually adopted by statute (see Table IV). 
The burden of liability is a function of many variables, the most 
important of which are the rule of liability and the standard of lia-
bility. As these rules and standards vary, producer and consumer be-
havior would be expected to vary. The only variable which is readily 
quantifiable is the liability rule. In the analysis contained in 
chapter three, the burden of liability was specified as being contin-
uous and between zero and one. The empirical analysis presumes that 
strict products liability represents a larger burden than negligence 
and that comparative negligence represents a smaller burden than 
strict products liability, though presumably a larger burden than neg-
ligence. The analysis of the relationship between the rule of liabil-
ity and product related accidents is presented in chapter six. 
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TABLE III~<' 
STATUTES AND CASES DETERMINING LIABILITY 
Alabama 
(1976) 
Alaska 
(1970) 
Arizona 
(1968) 
Arkansas 
(1973) 
California 
(1962) 
Colorado 
(1974) 
Connecticut 
(1970) 
Delaware 
(1976) 
Florida 
(1976) 
Georgia 
(1975) 
Establishment of Strict Liability 
Atkins v. American Motors Corporation, 335 
So. 2d 134 (1976) 
Casrill v. Altech Indus., 335 So. 2d 128 
(1976) 
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P. 2d 319 (1970) 
O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz 556, 
447 P. 2d 248, (1968) 
Arkansas Stat. Ann. § 85-2-318 (1985 
supp) 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 
2d 51, 27 Cal Rptr 697, 377 P. 2d 897 
(1962) 
Bradford v. Bendix - Westinghouse Auto, Air 
and Brake, 33 Colo App 99, 517 P. 2d 406 
(1974) 
Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn 496, 271 A. 2d 
84 (1970) 
Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc. 353 A. 2d 
581 (1976) 
(limited to product bailments) 
West v. Caterpiller Tractor Company, Inc. 
Fla 336 So 2d 80 (1976) 
Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga 868, 
218 S.E. 2d 580 (1975) 
Hawaii 
(1970) 
Idaho 
(1974) 
Illinois 
(1965) 
Indiana 
(1970) 
Iowa 
(1970) 
Kansas 
(1976) 
Kentucky 
(1966) 
Louisiana 
(1971) 
Maine 
(1973) 
Maryland 
(1976) 
Massachusetts 
(1958) 
Michigan 
(1965) 
Minnesota 
(1969) 
TABLE III* (Continued) 
Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car ~. 52 Huw 
71, 470 P. 2d 240 (1970) 
Shields v. Morton Chemical Co. 518 P. 2d 
857 (1974) 
Suvada v. White Moton Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612 
(1986) 
Perfect Paint and Color Co. v. Karduris, 
142, Ind. App. 106 611, 258 N.E. 2d (1970) 
Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 
174 N.W. 2d 672 (1970) 
Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan 698, 545 P. 2d 
1104 (1976) 
Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. 
Co., 402 S.W. 2d 441 (Ky 1966) 
Weber v. Fidelity~ Cas. Inc. of New York, 
259 La 599 So. 2d 754 (1971) 
14 M.R.S.A. § 221 (1973) 
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 
337, 363 A. 2d 955 (1976) 
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Rely's on warranty Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 
106 § 2-314 to 318 (West 1958) 
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 
Mich. 85 133 N.W. 2d 129 (1965) 
Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 2 84 Minn 115, 
169 N.W. 2d 587 (1969) 
Mississippi 
(1966) 
Missouri 
(1974) 
Montana 
(1973) 
Nebraska 
(1971) 
Nevada 
(1970) 
New Hampshire 
(1969) 
New Jersey 
(1965) 
New Mexico 
(1972) 
New York 
(1973) 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
(1974) 
Ohio 
(1966) 
Oklahoma 
(1974) 
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TABLE III~~ (Continued) 
State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 S. 2d 
113 (1966) 
Gilberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W. 2d 8 
(1974) 
Branden Berger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 
Mont. 506, 513 P. 2d 268 (1973) 
Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb 428 191 
N.W. 2d 601 (1971) 
Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev 408, 
470 P. 2d 135 (1970) 
Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard~ Sons. Inc., 
110 N.H. 36, 260 A. 2d 111 (1969) 
Santor v. A&M Karragheusin, Inc., 44 NJ 52 
207 A. 2d 305 (1965) 
Stang v. Hertz Corp, 83 NM 730 497 P. 2d 
732 (1972) 
Codling v. Paglia, 32 NY. 2d 330, 298 N.E. 
298 622 (1973) 
Not Applicable 
Johnson v. American Motors Corp. , 2 7 5 N. '\f. 
2d 57 (1974) 
Lazrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio 
St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966) 
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P. 2d 
1353 (1974) 
Oregon 
(1967) 
Pennsylvania 
(1966) 
Rhode Island 
(1971) 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
(1966) 
Texas 
(1969) 
Utah 
(1979) 
Vermont 
(1975) 
Virginia 
Washington 
(1969) 
West Virginia 
(1979) 
Wisconsin 
(1967) 
TABLE III* (Continued) 
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 OR 467, 435 
P. 2d 806 (1967) 
Webb v. Zern, 472 Pa 424 200 A. 2d 853 
(1966) 
Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 
176 A. 2d (1971) 
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Relys on warranty S.C. code Ann. § 36-2-314 
to 318 (Law Coop 1977) 
See also Lane v. Trenholm, 299 S.E. 2d 728 
Ford Motor Company v. Lanon, 217 Tenn 400, 
398 s.w. 2d 240 1966 
Daryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W. 2d 630 
Tex (1969) 
Ernest R Hahn, Inc v. Armco Steel Co., 601 
P. 2d 152 Utah 1979 
Zaleski v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150 333 A. 2d 110 
(1975) 
Relys on warranty V.A. Code § 8-2-314 to 
318 (1965) 
Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 
452 P. 2d 729 (1969) 
Morningstar v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 
253 S.E. 2d 666 W.V '(1979) 
Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wise 2d 443, 155 N.W. 
2d 55 (1967) 
Wyoming 
(1972) 
74 
TABLE III~~ (Continued) 
Re1ys on warranty 'Wyo Stat. Ann. Sec 1 -- 1 
-- 109 (1972) 
Alabama 
Alaska 
(1975) 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
(1975) 
California 
(1975) 
Colorado 
(1973) 
Connecticut 
(1973) 
Delaware 
Florida 
(1973) 
Georgia 
(1968) 
Hawaii 
(1976) 
Idaho 
(1979) 
Illinois 
(1981) 
TABLE III~'<" (Continued) 
Comparative Fault Applied to Negligence 
Not Applicable. 
Kaatz v. State, 540 P. 2d 1037 (Alaska 
1975) 
Not Applicable. 
Arkansas Stat. Ann. § 27-1765 (1979) 
Enacted 1975 
Li v. Yellow Cab, (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 804, 
119 Cal. Rptr 858, 532 P. 2d 1226 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111 (Supp 1983) 
Enacted 1973 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572 (L) (West 
Supp 1984) Effective 1973 
Not Applicable. 
Hoffman v. Jones, 780 So 2d 431 (1973) 
Zayer of Georgia, Inc. v. Ray, 117 Ga App. 
160 S.E. 2d 648 (1968) 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 663-31 Enacted 1976 
Idaho Code § 6-801 (1979) 
Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E. 2d 
886 
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Indiana 
(1983) 
Iowa 
(1982) 
Kansas 
(1976) 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
(1980) 
Maine 
(1965) 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
(1978) 
Michigan 
(1979) 
Minnesota 
(1969) 
Mississippi 
(1910) 
Missouri 
(1983) 
Montana 
(1977) 
TABLE III'>'~ (Continued) 
Ind. Code Ann § 34-4-33-14 (West Supp 
1983-1984) 
76 
Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W. 2d 742 (1982) 
Kansas Stat. Sec. 60 258a (1976) 
Not Applicable. 
La. Civil Code Ann. Art 2323 (West supp 
1984) Effective 1980 
Me Rev. Stat. Ann. (4 § 156 (1964) 
Not Applicable. 
Mass Gen Laws Ann Ch. 231 § 85 (1978) 
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 
Mich. 638, 275 N.W. 2d 511 (1979) 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.01 (West Supp 1984) 
1910 Miss. Laws 135 Ms. Code Ann§ 58-607.1 
(Supp 1977) 
Gustafson v. Benda 661 S.W. 2d 11 (1983) 
Montana Rev. Codes Ann. Sec. 58-607.1 supp 
(1977) 
Nebraska 
(1913) 
Nevada 
(1973) 
New Hampshire 
(1969) 
New Jersey 
(1973) 
New Mexico 
(1981) 
New York 
(1975) 
North Carolina 
(1977)2 
North Dakota 
(1975) 
Ohio 
(1980) 
Oklahoma 
(1979) 
Oregon 
(1975) 
Pennsylvania 
(1978) 
Rhode Island 
(1971) 
TABLE III* (Continued) 
Neb. Rev. Stat § 24-1151 Laws (1979) 
Laws 1913, C. 124, §1, p. 311 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41-141 (1979) 
N.H. Rev. Stat § 507: 7-A (1983) 
N.J. S.A. 2A: 15-5.1 to 5.3 
77 
Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P. 2d 1234 (1981) 
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976) 
Relys on Warranty S.C. Code. Ann. § 
36-2-314 to 318 (Law Coop 1977) 
N.D. CENT. Code§ 9-10-07 (1975) 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2315.19 (Page 1981) 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. § 13, § 14 (West supp 
1983-84) 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 18:407 (1981) 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 42 § 7102 (Pardon 1982 
Supp. 1984-85) 
R.I. General Laws §§ 9-20-4 ?? 4.1 (Supp 
1983) 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
(1977) 
Utah 
(1973) 
Vermont 
(1974) 
Virginia 
Washington 
(1974) 
West Virginia 
(1979) 
Wisconsin 
(1931) 
Wyoming 
(1973) 
TABLE III~~ (Continued) 
Not Applicable. 
Not Applicable. 
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2212a 
(Vernon Supp 83-84) 
Utah Code Ann § 78-27-37 (1977) 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 Sec 1036 (1973) 
Not Applicable. 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4-22-05 (Supp 
1983-84) 
Bradley v. Appalacian Power Co., 256 S.E. 
2d, 879 (W.V. 1979) 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.045 (West 1983) 
((1931) Wis. Laws 242) 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-09 (Supp 84) 
Laws 1973, ch. 28, § 1 
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Alabama 
Alaska 
(1976) 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
(1975) 
California 
(1978) 
Colorado 
(1973) 
Connecticut 
(1979) 
Delaware 
Florida 
(1976) 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
(1982) 
Idaho 
(1976) 
TABLE III* (Continued) 
Comparative Fault Merged with Strict 
Products Liability 
Not Applicable. 
Butaud v. Suburban Marina and Sporting 
Goods, Inc., 555 P. 2d 42 (1976) 
Not Applicable. 
Arkansas Stat. Ann. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 
Daly v. General Motors Corporation, 575 P. 
2d 1162 (1978) 
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P. 
2d 441 (1978) 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-406 (Supp 1983) 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 52-572 (o) 
Not Applicable. 
West v. Caterpiller Tractor Company, Inc., 
Fla. 336 So. 2d 80 (1976) 
Not Applicable. 
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Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing Hawaii, 654 
P. 2d 343 (1982) 
Sun Valley Airlines Inc. v. Avco Lycoming, 
Corp., 2111 F. Supp 598 (1976) 
Illinois 
Indiana 
(1983) 
Kansas 
(1980) 
Kentucky 
(1984) 
Louisiana 
Maine 
(1965) 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
(1977) 
Mississippi 
(1975) 
Missouri 
Montana 
(1983) 
TABLE III''" (Continued) 
Not Applicable. 
Ind. Code Ann § 34-4-33-14 (West Supp 
1983-1984) 
Not Applicable. 
80 
Kennedy v. The City of Sawyer, 228 Kan 439, 
618 P. 2d 788 (1980) 
Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W. 2d 713 (Ky 1984) 
Not Applicable. 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14 § 156 (1965) 
Not Applicable. 
Not Applicable. 
Not Applicable. 
Busch v. Busch Construction Inc. 262 N.W. 
2d, 377 (1977) 
Edwards v. Sears and Roebuck Co., 512 F. 2d 
276 (1975) 
Not Applicable. 
Trust Corp of Montana v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 506 F supp 1093, 38 St. Rep. 249 
(D.C. Mont 1981) (Zahrte v. Strum, Ruger~ 
Co., 661 P. 2d 17 (Mont 1983)) 
Nebraska 
(1979) 
Nevada 
(1981) 
New Hampshire 
(1978) 
New Jersey 
(1979) 
New Mexico 
(1981) 
New York 
(1975) 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
(1984) 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
(1982) 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
TABLE III* (Continued) 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (1979) 
Aetna Casualty~ Surety Co. v. Jeppson~ 
Co. 642 F. 2d 339 (9th Cir 1981) 
81 
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck~ Co., 118 N.H.-
802, 395 A. 2d 843 (1978) 
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry ~ Machine, 81 
NJ 150 406 A. 2d 140 (1979) 
Scott v. Rizzo, NM, 634 P. 2d 1234 
NY Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976) 
(effective 1975) 
Not Applicable. 
Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales ~ Service, 
Inc., 345 N.W. 2d 338 (1984) 
Day v. General Motors ~. 345 N.W. 2d 
349 (1984) 
Not Applicable. 
Not Applicable. 
Sandford v. Cheverolet Division of General 
Motors, 292 or 590, 642 P. 2d 624 (1982) 
Not Applicable. 
Not Applicable. 
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TABLE III* (Continued) 
South Carolina Not Applicable. 
Tennessee Not Applicable. 
Texas 
(184) 
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W. 2d 
414 (1984) 
Utah 
(1981) 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
(1982) 
Wisconsin 
(1967) 
Wyoming 
Mulherin v. Ingersol-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d 
1301 (1981) 
Not Applicable. 
Not Applicable. 
Not Applicable. 
Star Furniture Co. v. Palaski Furniture 
~ 297 S.E. 2d 854 (1982) 
Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wise. 2d 443, 155 
N.W. 2d 55 (1967) 
Not Applicable. 
* The information in this table is drawn from a number of sources. 
The primary problem in gathering these data was in determining the 
effective dates of statutes or court rulings. This often necessitated 
a direct referral to a statute or case. Below is a list of primary 
sources which provided preliminary listings of cases and statutes. 
West v. Caterpiller Tractor Company, Inc., Fl. 336 SO. 2d 80 
Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 NE 2d 886 
Henry Woods "The Trend Towards Comparative Fault." Journal of 
Products Liability, Vol. 7 (1984) pp. 399-411. 
Henry Wood "Product Liability: Is Comparative Fault Winning the Day" 
Arkansas Law Review Vol. 36 (1983) pp. 360-382. 
Lawrence R. Kulig "Comment: Comparative Negligence and Strict 
Products Liability: Where Do We Stand? Where Do We Go?" 
Villanova Law Review Vol. 29 (Je 1984) pp. 695-740. 
Richard K. Hermann "An Overview of State Statutory Product Liability 
Law" The Trial Lawyers Guide Vol. 27 (Spr 83) pp. 1-52. 
83 
American Jurrisprudence 2d Products Liability Vol. 63 (1984) § 528-549 
pp. 723-770. 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
84 
TABLE IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LEGISLATION* 
Eff. July 30, 1979 
Statute of Limitations. 
Statute of repose. 
,Not applied retroactively. 
Combines into one action 
claims for negligence, 
breach of warranty and manu-
facturers liability. Lim-
ited to "natural persons" 
1 year 
10 years (may be waived or 
extended by contract and 
does not apply to continuing 
obligations or latent de-
fects). 
Alternative "B" to §2-318 of U.C.C. has been adopted. 
No separate products liability statute. 
Alternate "A" of §2-318 U.C.C. 
September 3, 1978 
Statute of limitations. 
Statute of repose. 
Alternate "A" of §2-318. 
Establishes Affirmative de-
fenses of 
(1) "State of Art" 
(2) Alternation or modifica-
tion of the Product 
(3) Unforeseeable use of 
misuse 
Complaint may not include 
any dollar amount in the 
addendum clause. 
Prohibition of use of 
changes in state of art as 
evidence of a defect 
2 years 
12 years from first date of 
sale for use or consumption. 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
adapted in 1979 Provides defenses of 
(1) Compliance with federal 
or state statutes or 
regulations 
(2) Use where consumer was 
aware that it was out-
side the anticipated 
life of the product. 
(3) Unforeseeable alterna-
tion or misuse. (goes 
to the degree of fault 
not an absolute defense) 
(state of Arkansas is 
not a defense but is 
admissible in evid.ence) 
Comparative fault statute is applicable if plaintiff 
is 50% or greater in responsibility. 
Statute of limitations. 
Alternate "A" of §2-318. 
1979 
1981 
Has not adopted §2-318. 
1977 
3 years 
Statute of limitation of 1 
year placed on asbestos 
cases. 
limited manufacturers lia-
bility in cases where pro-
duct was altered or modi-
fied. 
Rebuttable presumptions that 
product is not defective if: 
(1) it conformed to the 
state of the art. 
(2) complied with applicable 
codes of government 
standards. 
(3) the injury occurred more 
than ten years after the 
product was first sold 
for consumption or use. 
Colorado cont. 
Connecticut 
86 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Advances in technology one not admissible as evidence 
of a defect, but are allowable to establish a duty to 
warn. 
Statute of limitations. 
Statute of repose. 
3 years 
10 years with limitations of 
(1) latent defects 
(2) prolonged exposure to 
hazardous material 
(3) intentional misrepre-
sentation or fraud 
Alternate "B" of §2-318 U.C.C. 
October of 1979 
Statute of limitations. 
Statute of repose. 
(1) consolidates claims of 
strict liability, negli-
gence and breach of war-
ranty. 
(2) "comparative responsi-
bility" established. 
(3) provides a defense of 
alternation or modifica-
tion. 
(4) reduces damages by 
amount of workman com-
pensation. 
(5) provision for award of 
attorney's fees in friv-
olous cases. 
(6) punitive damages allowed 
if reckless disregard is 
present. 
(7) punitive damages limited 
to twice the amount of 
damages. 
3 years (prospectively from 
10/1/79) 
10 years 
Alternate "A" to §2-318 U.C.C. 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
No separate products liability statute. Strict pro-
ducts liability is limited to product bailments. 
Alternate "B" of §2-318. 
Statute of limitations. 4 years 
Statute of repose. 12 years 
Alternate "A" of §2-318 U.C.C. 
November 1, 1982 
Statute of repose. 10 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318. 
(pending bill) 
Statute of repose. 10 years 
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Statute of limitations. 3 years includes comparative 
responsibility and allows 
punitive damages for reck-
less disregard. 
Alternative "C" of §2-318. 
July 1980 
Comparative responsibility established. 
Changes in design or state of art do not establish 
defect, but can establish a failure to warn. 
Establishes greater protection for non-manufacturer 
sellers (with exceptions). 
No dollar amount allowed in addendum clauses. 
Idaho cont. 
• 
Illinois 
Indiana 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Statue of repose. 
Statute of limitations. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318. 
1979 
1980 Statue of repose. 
Statute of limitation. 
10 years can be altered by 
warranty, fraud or misrepre-
sentation, or prolonged ex-
posure . 
2 years 
adopted a statutory strict 
liability in tort which ap-
pears to limit that estab-
lished in case law. 
10 years (unless the product 
is sold by letter in/which 
case it may be 12 years if 
the 12 years is earlier than 
the 10 years). 
8 years as long as it falls 
within the statute of re-
pose. 
2 years if it falls outside 
of the state of repose. 
Alternate "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
Effective 1978 
Statute of repose. 
Statue of limitations. 
Codification of state common 
law strict liability in 
tort. Defenses of 
(1) assumption of risk 
(2) nonforeseeable misuse 
(3) nonforeseeable modifica-
tion or alternation. 
(4) state of the art 
10 years. 
2 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
No distinct Statute. 
Alternative "C" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
1981 
Defenses 
Statute of repose. 
consolidates claims for 
strict products liability, 
negligence and breach of 
warranty. 
(1) compliance with govern-
ment standards 
(2) assumption of risk or 
contributory negligence 
presumption of safe life of 
10 years. Rebuttable for 
(1) extended warranty 
(2) misrepresentation 
(3) prolonged exposure 
Alternate "B" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
Effective 1978 
Established Defenses of 
Statute of repose. 
(1) Alternation or Modifica-
tion 
(2) Contributory Negligence 
(3) State of Art 
(4) Advances in product are 
not admissible 
5 years for sale 
8 years from manufacture 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
"The seller who knows the vice of a thing he sells and 
omits to declare it, besides the restitution of the 
price and repayment of the expenses, including reason-
able attorney's fees, is answerable to the buyer for 
damages." 
Louisiana Civil Code Art 2545 (1972 comp ed) 
Not adopted §2-318 of U.C.C. 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
1973 
Unique version of §2-318. 
1981 
Alternative "B" of §2-318. 
Statutory provision for 
strict products liability 
Introduced but failed 
No separate products liability act 
Unique version of §2-318. 
1978 (1) State of art is admis-
sible 
(2) Compliance with state or 
federal laws is admis-
sible 
(3) Changes in state of art 
are not admissible 
(4) Provides for comparative 
fault 
Statute of repose. 10 years 
Statute of limitations. 3 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
1978 
Statute of limitations. 
Alternative "C" of §2-318. 
Adopted comparative fault, 
uses the useful life defense 
for repose 
4 years 
No state product liability statute. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
No state product liability statute. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
No specific products liability statute. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
1978 Allows for one product lia-
bility action regardless for 
the theory. 
Statute of repose. 
Statute of limitations. 
State of art defense is 
available. 
10 years 
4 years 
comparative negligence is in 
effect. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
No products liability statute but does have compara-
tive negligence. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
1978 
Defenses 
Consolidates actions into 
claim. 
Modification or alteration 
state of the art. 
Comparative fault is available. 
Statute of limitation. 3 years 
Statute of repose. 12 years 
Unique version of §2-318. 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
New Jersey No products liability statute. 
Comparative fault statute is in effect. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
New Mexico No products liability statute. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
New York No products liability statute. 
Alternative "B" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
North Carolina 1979 Defenses 
North Dakota 
Statute of repose. 
Statute of limitations. 
(a) modification or altera-
tion 
(b) contributory negligence 
or assumption of risk. 
10 years 
3 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
July 1979 Provides that there is one 
action regardless of other 
theories. 
Alternation is a complete defense. 
Presumption that not defective is in compliant with 
government regulations. 
Statute of Repose/ 
limitations. 10 years from initial pur-
chase 
Alternative "C" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
No product liability statute. 
General Statute of 
limitations. 2 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
No product liability statute. 
Comparative fault has been adopted. 
1978 
Statute of Repose. 
Statute of limitation. 
Establishes 402A and com-
ments. 
Disputable presumption that 
product is not usually de-
fective. 
Alteration or modification 
is a conditional defense. 
Punitive damages are avail-
able if wanton disregard. 
8 years 
2 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
No product liability statute. 
(one had been introduced and was under consideration) 
Alternative of "A" §2-318, U.C.C. 
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1978 Allows defense of alteration 
or modification. 
Statute of Limitations/ 
repose. 10 years 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Rhode Island cont. 
Comparative fault is available. 
Alternative "C" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
South Carolina No products liability statute. 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Alternative "B" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
1979 Provides defenses of altera-
tion or modification 
Comparatione fault has been adopted. 
Statute of limitations/ 
repose. 6 years 
Alternative "B" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
1978 Provides for one product 
liability action. 
State of art is a defense but not on absolute defense. 
Alteration or modification is a defense as long as it 
is not foreseeable. Addendum clause must state the 
amount. 
Statute of repose. 
Statute of limitations. 
10 years (unless anticipated 
life has expired) 
6 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
No specific products liability statute. 
Unique versions of §2-318, U.C.C. 
1977 Alteration or modification 
is a defense where it 
changed the purpose, use, 
Utah cont. 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Statute of limitations/ 
repose. 
function or intended use of 
the product. 
6 years from purchase or 
10 years from manufacture. 
Prohibition of amount in the addendum clause. 
Alternative "C" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
No products liability statute. 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
No separate products liability statute. 
Unique version of §2-318, U.C.C. 
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1981 Provides one product liabil-
ity claim regardless of 
theory. 
State of art is admissible 
through out an absolute de-
fense. 
Compliance with mandatory 
regulations is a complete 
defense. 
Contributory fault is in effect. 
Rebuttable presumption 
that useful life is 
Statute of limitations 
12 years 
3 years 
Alternative "A" of §2-318, U.C.C. 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
West Virginia No separate products liability statute. 
Alternative »A» of §2-318, U.C.C. 
Wisconsin Many attempted but non adopted. 
Comparative fault is in effect. 
Alternative »A» of §2-318, U.C.C. 
Wyoming No separate products liability statute. 
Comparative fault is in effect. 
Alternative »B» of §2-318, U.C.C. 
* This information is summarized from an overview of state statutory 
product liability law by Richard K. Hermann, The Trial Lawyers Guide 
27 Spring 83, pp. 1-52. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ESTIMATION OF THE IMPACT OF 
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
This analysis seeks to measure the impact of varying product lia-
bility rules on observed product related accidents. The model, as de-
veloped in chapter three, indicates that any result is possible. An 
increase in the burden of liability on the producer is expected to in-
crease the level of care which is provided by the producer and reduce 
the level of care provided by the consumer. When this occurs, 
observed accidents may rise or fall depending on the relative produc-
tivities of producers and consumers. In chapter four it was shown 
that the rule of strict liability was adapted individually at the op-
tion of the states. The data of interest concerns the date of each 
state's adaption of strict product liability. This provides a measure 
of the length of time a state has been under strict product liability. 
The final element of analysis is the observed level of accidents. 
These data are provided by the National Electronic Inquiry Surveil-
lance System (NEISS) of the Consumers Products Safety Commission 
(CPSC). 1 These accident observations are correlated with the amount 
of time under strict products liability to render an analysis that 
describes how reported accidents vary with the rule of liability. The 
results are as would be expected. Some products yield a significant 
negative correlation while others exhibit a marginal negative, insig-
nificant positive, or insignificant negative correlation. This chap-
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ter begins with a description of the dependant variable that is used. 
Section two contains the regression results and section three contains 
conclusions and discussion. 
Section 1: The Measurement of Product Related Accidents 
Product related accidents as reported to the NEISS system are 
d . h" 1 . 2 use 1.n t 1.s ana ys1.s. The NEISS data are gathered from a sample of 
hos- pitals in the United States. These data are used to calculate 
national estimates. The current sample of hospitals was randomly 
selected from the 1975 Master Facilities Inventory (MFI) tape which is 
compiled annually for the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) 
by the American Hospital Association (AHA). The A.H.A. conducts an 
annual survey of those member hospitals which meet 13 requirements 
(the most important of which is that they have 6 or more beds). This 
survey is then supplemented by 250 to 300 hospitals which are not 
registered. The questionnaire is completed by 95 percent of the hos-
pitals. The registered and unregistered samples are merged. 
Hospitals specializing in the treatment of the mentally retarded are 
deleted and the resultant tape sold as the MFI tape. In order to fur-
ther narrow the sample to those which are more likely to be involved 
in product related accidents, hospitals specializing in psychiatry, 
maternity, narcotic addiction, respiratory diseases, rehabilitation, 
chronic disease and other specialties were excluded. The resultant 
sample consists of 6,015 hospitals, from which NEISS selected its 
sampling of hospitals. The data collected at these hospitals consist 
of product related accidents reported to the emergency room in each of 
the NEISS sample hospitals. 
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This sample of 6,015 hospitals is stratified on the basis of size 
(by emergency room visits) and geography. There are four size stra-
tums with hospitals ordered geographically. Given this method of 
structuring the data, the NEISS budget can accommodate 130 hospitals. 
The sample of hospitals has been revised during 1978, 1979 and 1980, 
so that no hospitals in the sample prior to 1979 are in the sample 
after 1979. 
NEISS provides three accident observation variables. 3 The first 
is a national estimate of accidents in approximately 1,100 product 
categories. The most important problem with using any national 
aggregated data is that product liability laws vary from state to 
state, thus preventing the use of a change in legal structure observed 
in the states as an independent variable. It is impossible to encom-
pass the impact of changing liability rules on the national 
estimates. Thus, this variable will not be used. 
The second variable is the total number of product related acci-
dents reported at hospitals in the NEISS system. NEISS collects data 
consisting of the number of product related accidents reported at the 
emergency rooms of the sample hospitals. It must be emphasized that 
these data consist exclusively of the number of accidents reported to 
the various hospital emergency departments. This means that the 
severity of injury is not reflected in this data, thus differences in 
the provision of "care" which alter accident severity will not be cap-
tured. The system has been collecting data on an annual basis since 
1972. Participation in the NEISS system is voluntary, with some turn 
over observed in each year. The sample of hospitals has been reduced 
in recent years (perhaps due to the federal budgetary and policy posi-
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tions). The above considerations result in the number of hospitals 
varying between 70 and 130. The main interest in these aggregate ob-
servations is to analyze any correlation between the rule of liability 
and the general level of product related accidents. These data are 
in the form of a series of cross-sectional observations. 
The third data consists of hospital observations for a number of 
specific products. Again, the analysis is cross sectional in nature. 
If the variation in the rule of liability has had any meaningful im-
pact on the safety of consumption it should be reflected here. Aggre-
gate and disaggregate hospital data provide the opportunity to analyze 
variation in the rule of liability on product related accidents. 
The sample of hospitals is further restricted due to the availa-
bility of the independent variables and as a result of the deletion of 
all questionable observations. Since hospitals enter and leave the 
system continuously, valid observations are only those for hospitals 
which were in the sample in both the preceding and the following year. 
After these factors are considered the sample of hospitals has fifty 
to fifty-five observations. 
Section 2 The Regression Model. 
The theoretical analysis as developed in chapter three of this 
paper indicates that a change in the liability rule will have an 
ambiguous result on the consumer's provision of care, with the most 
plausible result that as the consumer's burden of liability falls his 
provision of care will fall. Other authors (most notably Spence 
[1977] and Oi [1973]) indicate that as the producers liability burden 
rises his provision of care will rise. Consumer's care and producer's 
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care are the critical determinants of product related accidents. The 
rule of liability is one of the determinants of the producers burden 
of liability. The producer's burden is larger and the consumer's bur-
den smaller, ceteris paribus, under strict liability than under negli-
gence. A change from negligence to strict liability, thus, increases 
the producer's burden of liability thereby increasing his incentive to 
provide care, while simultaneously reducing the consumer's burden of 
liability and incentive to provide care. It must be emphasized that 
observed accidents are for all types of emergency room accidents and 
thus are not accidents which might be limited to those particular cir-
cumstances addressed by products liability. The product's involvement 
in the accident may be only tangentially related to the occurrence of 
the injury and not necessarily the sole or primary cause of the accid-
ent. As the levels of consumer and producer care change observed pro-
duct related accidents change. If variations in the rule of liability 
are associated with changes in the provision of care by producers or 
consumers, then these changes should be reflected in the level of ob-
served accidents. 
There are four rules of liability which have been used in pro-
ducts liability cases in recent years. These are negligence, negli-
gence with comparative fault, strict liability, and strict liability 
with comparative fault. Since observed city per capita income is 
available only for 1975 the regression model is restricted to the 
1975 observations for specific products, while aggregate data will be 
analyzed for the 1973 to 1978 period using 1975 data for the independ-
ent variables. This restriction allows an empirical analysis of only 
strict liability. Consumption is, in the short run, locked into those 
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goods which are immediately available. Since many goods are consumed 
over a long period of time, the impact of the change in the provision 
of safety by the producer occurs over a number of years. As the old 
"less safe" products are replaced by the new "more safe" products, 
observed product related accidents are expected to fall, ceteris 
paribus. Safer consumption is expected to be correlated with the 
length of time under rule of strict products liability. Since 1975 
data is being used, 1976 is used as the base year, and is used to cal-
culate the length of time under strict products liability by taking 
the difference between 1976 and the year th~t strict products liabil-
ity was adopted. If strict products liability was adopted in 1967 
then the proxy for liability is nine. Nine measures the relative im-
pact of strict products liability, and is expected to be associated 
with a smaller level of observed accidents than if strict liability 
was adopted in 1974, ceteris paribus. 
Theory indicates that a change in the rule of liability will in-
fluence the producer's and consumer's provision of care. Changes in 
their provision of care will effect the level of observed accidents. 
Observed accidents are correlated with the length of time under strict 
products liability in order to analyze the impact of changes in pro-
ducts liability law. There are two measures of liability used in this 
analysis. The first is the variable described above. This variable 
includes negative values for states which have adopted strict products 
liability after 1976. The second measure sets all negative values in 
the first proxy equal to zero. The second measure is the more 
accurate of the two, since no change in behavior is anticipated in the 
absence of an explicit liability rule change. 
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There are three other variables which are included in this analy-
sis: l) per capita income, 2) hospital control and 3) a population 
proxy. Buchannan [1970] has suggested that per capita income might 
influence the consumer's choice of risk characteristics embodied in 
the products which he uses. The implication being that as income 
rises the level of risk in the goods used will fall due to the use of 
safer products. 
Hospital control separates the sample into those which are gov-
ernrnent controlled and those which are private non-profit. This vari-
able is included to capture the potential tendency of the "poor" to 
seek aid in government hospitals. Ideally, this sample separates for-
profit and not-for-profit hospitals. There are only four for-profit 
hospitals in the sample, preventing the use of this grouping. This 
variable is assigned a value of one for public hospitals and zero for 
private hospitals. 
The final variable is the population proxy. The population which 
each hospital serves is expected to influence the number of accidents 
observed at the hospital; thus, ceteris paribus, the larger this popu-
lation the larger the number of observed accidents. The population 
proxy is calculated by taking the number of beds in the hospital as a 
percent of the total number of beds in hospitals with emergency de-
partments and multiplying this by the city's population. This proxy 
is 
Beds in hospital 
p ( ) • City Population. 5.1 
Total Number of Beds 
The model is 
Product Related 
Accidents a + ~l Per Capita Income + ~2 P 
+ ~3 Control + ~4 Liability. 
The Null Hypotheses for the non liability variables are 
Ho: ~1 > o 
Ho: ~2 < o 
Ho: ~3 o. 
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The anticipated results of this analysis with respect to popula-
tion and per capita income are straightforward. The expected results 
with respect to the length of time under liability are much less 
clear. The model developed in chapter three indicates that as the 
consumer's burden of liability falls he will provide less care. Pre-
vious analyses (Oi [1973], Spence [1977]) indicate that the shift in 
liability to the producer will result in a rise in the producer's pro-
vision of care. These two changes act to offset one another. There 
are three potential results: (1) observed accidents rise, (2) 
observed accidents fall, and (3) observed accidents do not change. A 
rise in observed accidents could result if the consumer's provision of 
care falls, while the producer's marginal product of care is zero. 
The fall in consumer's care cannot be offset by increasing the pro-
ducer's level of care. Observed accidents could fall if the rise in 
the producer's provision of care is large enough to offset the fall in 
the consumer's provision of care. If the producer and consumer begin 
in a competitive equilibrium, this result is unlikely. In equilib-
rium, the value of a dollar spent by the producer on the provision has 
the same value to the consumer, since it is reflected in the price of 
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the good, as a marginal dollar spent on a consumption activity. The 
marginal utilities-per-dollar spent are equal across all uses. If 
diminishing returns for care are present and observed accidents fall, 
then the nominal rise in producer's care, and thus in price, must be 
larger than the nominal value of the consumer's decrease in the pro-
vision of care. A more plausible explanation is that consumers are 
misinformed as to the risks involved in consumption. In this situa-
tion, a rise in the producer's provision of care will result in a fall 
in the level of observed accidents. The producer may be providing 
safer products or more information, in either situation observed ac-
cidents will fall. Observed accidents may remain unchanged due to 
completely offsetting changes in care, or due to consumer's and pro-
ducer's provision of care being fixed as a result of the consumption 
characteristics of the product. The preceding indicates that no gen-
eral statement as to the impact of a change in the rule of liability 
can be made. It will depend on the relative productivity of producers 
and consumers as well as the level of information. The results are 
expected to exhibit the ad hoc nature of the impact of the rule of 
liability. Variability of the statistical significance of the coeffi-
cients is expected to be a observed across the products analyzed, de-
pending upon the product specific productivities of producer and con-
sumer care and the amount of information which is available. Since 
one of the purported reasons for the adaption of strict product lia-
bility has been the provision of safer products the null hypothesis 
for the rule of liability is 
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Regressions have been run on six years of aggregate observed pro-
duct related accidents and on fifteen products for 1975. Each product 
has been involved in products liability litigation. 4 The empirical 
results are reported in Table V. Regression A uses the continuous 
measure of strict product liability while Regression B uses the 
truncated measure of liability. 
Section 3: Regression analysis of Aggregate Data. 
The aggregate data used in this analysis consist of the number of 
accidents reported in sample hospital emergency rooms. The explana-
tory power of this model is very limited. 2 Error sum squares and R 's 
are low in each regression each year. The explanatory power is dis-
turbing because some of the variables in the analysis should provide a 
higher explanatory power than is evident in the model. The population 
proxy is, perhaps, most disappointing. Of all variables which should 
explain aggregate observed product related accidents, population is 
expected to be most significant. Population obtains a ninety-five 
percent significance or better in 1973, 1977 and 1978 regressions A 
and B. In these years the null hypothesis is, thus, rejected at a 95% 
level of confidence. It is interesting that the t-ratios are smaller 
for 1975, the year from which the population proxy was calculated. 
This speaks more of the weakness of the proxy, than the usefulness of 
population in explaining product related accidents. A proxy using a 
percent of total admissions was used to calculate a second proxy with-
out an improvement in results and is not included. 
A second variable which should have explanatory power is per 
capita income. These results are even more disappointing. The high-
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est level of significance achieved is less than seventy percent with 
some t-ratios of one tenth or smaller. This bodes ill for the use of 
per capita income as an explanatory variable for product related ac-
cidents. The null hypothesis is not rejected for per capita income. 
This brings into question the arguments used by Buchanan [1970] and Oi 
[1973] which imply that variations in income should result in varia-
tions in the level of care purchased by consumers. The traditional 
arguments are not necessarily inconsistent with this result. If con-
sumers purchase safer products but engage in riskier consumption or 
reduce their level of care, an insignificant coefficient could easily 
be observed. This possibility is reinforced by the aggregation of all 
products into the independent variable. 
The third variable is the dummy used for control. The null 
hypothesis is rejected only for 1978. The poorest results occur in 
1974 and 1975 with t-ratios less than one for 1975 and less than one 
twentieth for 1974. The control variables are included more as a pos-
sibility than due to concise theoretical analysis. If a larger number 
of for-profit hospitals were in the sample of hospitals, better re-
sults would be expected by using a profit and not for-profit separa-
tion. 
The final variable of interest is the rule of liability. The 
rule of liability is marginally significant in 1974 B, 1975 A and B, 
1974 B, 1976 B and 1977 A and B. B regression, using the truncated 
measure of liability, is consistently more significant and all regres-
sions, except 1973 A, have a negative sign. Since 1975 is the base 
year for the measure of liability, the relative significance of the 
coefficients in 1975 is encouraging. If products liability has an 
TABLE V 
REGRESSION RFSUlli'S USING 1973-1978 AGGREGATE DATA AND 1975 PROIXJcr DATA 
1973 1974 1975 
Variable A B A B A B 
Intercept 1783.17 1970.33 3048.93* 3118.305* 4451. 77* 4512.2426* 
(0.83) (0.91) (1. 34) (1.39) (1. 70) (1. 75) 
Per-capita 0.187 0.2001 0.0463 0.104 -0.0483 0.0155 
Income (0.42) (0.45) (0.10) (0.22) (-0.09) (0.03) 
Population 0.0050** 0.0051** 0.0049* 0.00493* 0.0046 0.00458 
(1. 77) (1.82) (1.52) (1.54) (1.25) (1.25) 
Strict 8.6937 -35.603 -56.58 -114.124* -133.688* -191.405** 
Liability (0.14) (-0.47) (-0.81) (-1.35) (-1.66) (-1. 97) 
in Tort 
Control 857.6 797.787 10.304 35.331 660.225 769.708 
(1.17) (1.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.71) (0.84) 
R2 0.106 0.11 0.057 0.079 .009 0.118 
F Value 1.43 1.48 .074 1.05 1..35 1.64 
Degrees 53 53 53 53 52 52 
of Freedom 
1-' 
1-' 
,j:l. 
1976 
Variable A B 
Intercept 3117.51 3171.24 
(1.23) (1. 26) 
Per-capita 0.1474 0.196 
Income (0.28) (0.37) 
Population 0.0051 0.0051 
(1.41) (1.42) 
Strict 
-86.84 -133.045* 
Liability (-1.11) (-1.40) 
in Tort 
Control 1051.01 113.51 
(1.13) (1.22) 
R2 
.1026 .116 
F Value 1.37 1.57 
Degrees 52 52 
of Freedom 
TABLE V (Continued) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
1977 
A B 
2733.68 2674.03 
(1.18) (1.16) 
.1943 0.218 
(0.40) (0.45) 
.0061** 0.0061** 
(1.89) (1.87) 
-53.046* -58.77* 
(-1.43) (-1. 50) 
841.57 892.97 
(1.01) (1. 08) 
.141 .145 
1.97 2.03 
52 52 
1978 
A B 
986.696 1115.82 
(0.34) (0.39) 
0.393 0.418 
(0.66) (0. 70) 
0.0072** .00732** 
(1. 90) (1.93) 
-5.18 -51.126 
(-0.06) (-0 0 48) 
1849.41** 1799.38** 
(1. 80) (1. 78) 
.1642 .168 
2.16 2.23 
48 48 
f-' 
f-' 
l.n 
TABLE V (Continued) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Refrigerators Ranges 
Variable A B A B 
Intercept 14.737*** 14.93**** 13.912*** 13.976*** 
(2. 37) (2. 42) (2. 31) (2. 32) 
Per-capita -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.001112 -0.00105 
Income (-1.20) (-1.10) (-0. 88) (-0.83) 
Population .0000062 0.0000063 -0.0000021 -0.0000021 
(0. 70) (0.72) (-0.24) (-1.12) 
Strict -0.1599 -0.296* -0.203 -0.255 
Liability (-0.83) (-1.27) (-1. 09) (-1.12) 
in Tort 
Control 1.451 1.586 1.0419 1.259 
(0.64) (. 72) (0.48) (0.58) 
R2 0.064 0.08 .055 0.056 
F Value 0.82 1.06 0.70 0.71 
Degrees 52 52 52 52 
of Freedom 
Televisions 
A B 
11. 7132** 11.846** 
(1.87) (1.89) 
-0.000453 -0.00337 
(-0.35) (-0.26) 
.000419* 0.000118* 
(1.34) (1.33) 
-.3791** -0.485** 
(-1. 96) (-2. 05) 
-1.6014 -1.198 
(-0. 70) ( -0.53) 
.10492 .111 
1.41 1.49 
52 52 
1-' 
1-' 
0'\ 
TABLE V (Continued) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
HiFis Bunkbeds 
Variable A B A B 
Intercept 4o677 4o716 10o497** 10o555** 
(1. 24) (1.25) (2 0 07) (2 0 07) 
Per-capita -Oo00015 -Oo001346 -Oo00059 -Oo000525 
Income (-Oo20) -Ool7) (-0 0 56) (-Oo49) 
Population -Oo0000037 -Oo00000036 -Oo0000008 Oo0000010 
(-Oo69) (-Oo68) (-Ooll) (-Oo13) 
Strict -Oo21064 -Oo296 -Oo3331*** -Oo3868** 
Liability (-Ool5) (-Oo20) (-2o14) (-2 0 01) 
in Tort 
Control Oo0423 Oo0183 -1.453 -1.085 
(Oo36) (Ool3) (-Oo79) (-0 0 59) 
R2 o014 o012 o105 o0965 
F Value Ool8 Ool5 1.42 1.28 
Degrees 52 52 52 52 
of Freedom 
Furniture 
A B 
l2o905* l3o035* 
(1.45) (1.46) 
-Oo000315 -Oo00209 
(-Oo17) (-Oo11) 
Oo0000186* Oo000186* 
(1.47) (1.46) 
-Oo2816 -Oo3811 
(-1. 02) (-1.13) 
-2o628 -2o3359 
(-Oo81) (-Oo73) 
Oo0648 Oo069 
Oo83 Oo89 
52 52 
I-' 
I-' 
-..] 
TABIE V (Continued) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
ladders Pc:Mer Saws 
Variable A B A B 
Intercept 18.955* 19.172* 26.32** 26.723** 
( 1. 33) (1.33) (1. 71) (1. 75) 
Per-capita 0.0013 0.00152 -0.00074 -0.000399 
Income (0.43) (0. 50) (-0.23) (-0.12) 
Population 0.0000232 0.0000225 0.0000216 0.0000214 
(1.14) (1.10) (-0.99) (0. 98) 
Strict -1.1196****-1.3154**** -0.9747** -1.285*** 
Liability (-2. 54) (-2.41) (-2.06) (-2.22) 
in Tort 
Control -4.0316 -2.7945 -1.299 -0.2756 
(-0. 78) (-0.54) (-0.23) (-0.05) 
R2 0.137 0.1275 0.097 0.109 
F Value 1.91 1.28 1.29 1.46 
Degrees 52 52 52 52 
of Freedom 
Adhesive 
A B 
13.793 13.69 
(0.98) (-0.98) 
-0.0016 -0.0017 
(-0. 55) (-0.58) 
-0.0000089 -0.000087 
(-0.44) (-0.44) 
0.3501 0.4354 
(0.81) (0.82) 
-2.398 -2.775 
(-0.47) (-0.55) 
0.030 .030 
0.37 0.37 
52 52 
1-' 
1-' 
00 
TABlE V (Continued) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Glass other Glass 
Soft Drink Glass Bottles Alcohol 
Bottles Bottles 
Variable A B A B A B 
Intercept 12o1525 12o111 16o364 16o 727 15o776 15o809 
(1.04) (1. 03) (Oo82) (Oo84) (2 o19) (2 o19) 
Per-capita Oo00043 Oo00044 -Oo0014 -Oo00114 -Oo00207 -Oo00207* 
Income (Oo18) (Oo18) (-Oo33) (-Oo27) (-1. 38) * (-1. 37) 
Population Oo0000061 Oo0000058 Oo00007**** Oo000702****-0o0000068 -Oo000067 
(Oo37) (Oo35) (2 0 45) (2o47) (-Oo67) (-Oo65) 
strict -Oo315 -Oo301 -Oo27 -Oo5288 o1388 Oo123 
Liability (-Oo87) (-0 0 68) (-Oo44) (-Oo 70) (Oo63) (Oo45) 
in Tort 
Control -4o059 -3o6853 13o38** 13o606** 2o7676 2o599 
(-Oo 95) (-Oo87) (1.84) (1.89) (1. 06) (1.00) 
R2 Oo03 Oo025 o184 o188 o0709 o066 
F Value Oo38 Oo31 2o70 2o79 Oo91 Oo85 
Degrees 52 52 52 52 52 52 
of Freedom 
I-' 
I-' 
1.0 
TABlE V (Continued) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
lawn Mowers Chain Saws 
Variable A B A B 
Intercept 5.957 6.3003 10.58 10.761 
(0.45) (0.48) (0.91) (0.93) 
Per-capita 0.0028 0.00306 -0.00010 0.0000425 
Income (1. 00) (1.11) (-0. 04) (0.02) 
Population 0.000024* 0.000024* 0.0000056 0.0000056 
(1.28) (1.28) (0.34) (0.34) 
Strict -0.833** -1.0997*** -0.3418 -0.481 
Liability (-2.04) (-2.20) (-. 96) (-1.10) 
in Tort 
Control 1.11 1.983 1.416 1. 763 
(0.23) (0.42) (0.34) (0.42) 
R2 
.1237 .135 .026 .031 
F Value 1.69 1.88 0.31 0.39 
Degrees 52 52 52 52 
of Freedom 
Stairs/Steps 
A B 
103.977 105.33 
(0.62) (0.62) 
0.034 0.03576 
(0.96) (1. 01) 
0.000043 0.000344 
(0.18) (0.14) 
-12.695**** -14.1741*** 
(-2 .46) (-2.21) 
-43.412 -29.104 
(-0. 71) (-0.48) 
0.123 0.102 
1.66 1.37 
52 52 
1-' 
N 
0 
Doors 
Variable A 
Intercept 318.712** 
(1.97) 
Per-capita 0.000077 
Income (0.34) 
Population -0.037 
(-1. 08) 
Strict -4.188 
Liability (-0.84) 
in Tort 
Control 27.1269 
(0.46) 
R2 0.026 
F Value 0.62 
Degrees 52 
of Freedom 
TABLE V (Continued) 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
B 
323.138** 
(2 0 01) 
.0000798 
(0.35) 
-0.0335 
(-0. 99) 
-7.331 
(-1.20) 
30.838 
(0.53) 
0.063 
0.81 
52 
* Indicates a 90% level of confidence. 
** Indicates a 95% level of confidence. 
*** Indicates a 97.5% level ofconfidence. 
**** Indicates a 99% level of confidence. 
I-' 
N 
I-' 
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impact, it should have only a marginally significant impact on aggreg-
ate observed accidents. 
The second set of sixteen regressions contains the results for 
specific products. Per capita income is significant, at any level, 
only for bottles used in serving alcohol. Population is marginally 
significant for televisions and highly significant for other glass 
bottles. Control is significant only for other glass bottles. 
The results for the impact of the measures of liability on con-
sumer related accidents are encouraging, though only marginal in na-
ture. Refrigerators A, televisions A and B, bunkbeds A and B, ladders 
A and B, saws A and B, lawn mowers A and B, and stairs and steps A and 
B, have coefficients that test at a ninety percent level of signifi-
cance or higher, with only refrigerators A having a level of signifi-
cance of less the ninety five percent. The best results are for lad-
ders A and B and stairs and steps A which test at a ninety nine per-
cent level of significance. All coefficients which are significant 
exhibit negative signs. 
Section 4: Conclusions 
The empirical estimates provided in this chapter lend credence to 
those (such as Calabresi and Bass [1970]) who argue that strict lia-
bility or greater producer liability should be imposed in an ad hoc 
manner. The impact on the sample of products analyzed indicates that 
for selected products, the amount of time a state has been under the 
rule of strict products liability is negatively correlated with pro-
duct related accidents. 
CHAPTER V 
ENDNOTES 
1wakesberg, Joseph and Richard Valliant, NEISS Sample Redesign 
Final Report, U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission (Bethesda 
Maryland, November 1, 1977) pp. 1-1 to 5-24. 
2NEISS HosPital Survey Final Report, U.S. Consumer Products 
Safety Commission (Bethesda Maryland, January 1978) Part I pp. 1-33, 
Part II pp. 1-13. Survey of Ambulance Services for Sample Hospitals 
Final Report, U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission (Bethesda 
Maryland, September 1978) pp. 1-52. NEISS Coding Manual, U.S. 
Consumer Products Safety Commission, Directorate for Epidemiology 
(1985) pp. 1-219. 
3Product Su1nmary Report and NEISS Estimates of National Injury 
Incidents, U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission, (Bethesda, 
Maryland) For 1973-1985. Hospital data were procured directly from 
the Consumers Products Safety Commission. 
4American Jurisprudence, Vol. 63 §220-776. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis has demonstrated the potential ambiguities, 
theoretical and empirical, in the area of product liability. The 
empirical results tend to support the hypothesis that a rise in the 
burden of liability on the producer will result in safer consumption, 
but only for certain products. The strongest results are for the 
truncated measure of liability. Ladders, power saws, bunkbeds, lawn 
mowers, televisions and stairs and steps provide coefficients that 
test at or greater than a ninety five level of confidence. Other pro-
ducts provide coefficients for the liability rule that are insignifi-
cant and for adhesive and glass alcohol bottles insignificant and pos-
itive. 
There are several areas in which this analysis can be extended. 
The theoretical framework can be further simplified by assuming that 
work time is constant. This will allow expected utility to be stated 
as a function exclusively of care time. The framework can then be ex-
tended to consider the role the firm. When both the firm and consumer 
are included, a more complete comparative static analysis of the 
implications of varying products liability structure can be performed. 
A second extension lies in the empirical area. A large amount of 
data is available but is not used in this analysis. The main diffi-
culty in the use of this data is that it requires the procurement of 
124 
125 
observations for the independent variables. This requires the 
development of estimates for population and a more appropriate set of 
independent variables. Other independent variables which could be 
included are such things as a weather variable, industrial composi-
tion, and other characteristics of population, such as percent below 
poverty. 
A third extension would allow for a more sophisticated measure of 
the producer's burden of liability. Integration of tort, legislative 
and regulatory standards as well as a more complete specification of 
tort liability should provide a better measure of the liability 
burden. The measure of strict product liability can be refined to 
allow for a product specific assumption instead of relying on the gen-
eral adoption of strict products liability. 
A final extension would be to analyze activities and products for 
which comparative negligence and negligence with comparative negli-
gence are applicable. This would allow a more comprehensive analysis 
of liability. 
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